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ABSTRACT
This paper provides new insights into payment behavior prediction by using daily ledger data from 
a case company. The results indicate that a model based on ledger information is more accurate 
and efficient in future payment failure prediction than models traditionally based on financial 
and background variables. More specifically, the results implicate that a company benefits the 
most from credit risk rating services when its own ledger data are used as a part of the rating 
scoring model. In addition, the results have three implications. First, ledger information can be 
used in the future to create more accurate and up-to-date credit rating scores, which reduces the 
dependency over publicly available information. Second, the length of the client firm-creditor 
firm relationship seems to significantly reduce problems of informational asymmetry. Third, 
problems of asymmetric information, such as adverse selection, lemon’s problem, moral hazard 
and agency costs could be significantly reduced in the future using a shared information pool 
deriving from corporate ledgers.
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1 Introduction
Financial distress, likelihood of bankruptcy and default in payments have long been in the 
centre of interest in the credit risk management field. However, the financial crisis and the 
sovereign debt crisis of the 21st century have increased the demand for an accurate method 
that helps companies predict not only bankruptcy but also possible signals of the way towards 
financial distress by looking at customers’ payment behavior. In addition to banks, for example 
trade credit managers are known to use models to predict corporate failure as part of their credit 
decision-making process. Nevertheless, the primary interest still remains in the customers’ 
payment behavior: will a firm pay its bills on time? So far, the information about a potential 
new corporate client’s payment history has only been accessible for companies dealing with 
a third party, such as a credit insurer, who has accumulated private knowledge from a large 
number of suppliers. On the other hand, in the UK for instance, scores describing past payment 
behavior have become more and more available in credit reports.  (See, also, Wilson, Summers 
& Hope, 2000).
1.1 Background and Motivation for the Study
This paper analyzes whether the knowledge of payment behavior and its prediction have 
importance in two contexts: that of payment delays implying a payment pattern rather than 
financial instability, or that of payment delays as a signal of financial troubles, or both. In 
addition to financial distress, payment failure might be a signal of a firm’s misuse of its business 
relationship with the creditor company; larger client firms generally bring more cash flow to 
a company, and higher purchase power might lead to arrogant behavior where investment 
opportunities are prioritized over prompt payment of trade creditors. Poor payment behavior, or 
failure to pay on time, may also be a sign of the use of trade credit as extended credit (Wilson 
& Summers, 2000). This thesis attempts to analyze whether payment failure can be predicted 
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accurately with payment history derived from a corporate ledger, or whether it can be related 
to financial difficulties. The results of this study could be useful in the development of modern 
credit rating systems and in the credit assessment process of any company. The results could 
be especially useful for the Finnish trade credit sector as the application of payment behavior 
information is trailing some other countries where payment indices are vastly used.1  
This thesis considers the contribution that daily client billing data and background information, 
gathered from a case company’s corporate ledger, can make to payment failure prediction at the 
corporate level. More specifically, I study whether a company’s internal ledger data has significant 
influence on the accuracy of a risk estimation model, even over external information, when 
predicting that company’s client firms’ payment delays. In addition, I study if a model using ledger 
data can be improved with data from a Finnish credit rating agency, Asiakastieto Ltd; I analyze 
both the value that individual financial and background variables can add to a model using ledger 
data, and the use of the rating agency’s existing rating scores in payment failure prediction.
Asiakastieto Ltd’s generic credit risk model uses ledger data to some extent, in addition to financial 
and background variables. I compare the prediction power of the current rating scores2 – based 
on external data from public financial statements, publicly available registries and a limited pool 
of corporate ledgers – to the contribution of the variables developed in this study – based on 
internal ledger data from a case company. Thus the objective of this paper is to study whether an 
interactive approach in rating scoring, that involves the customer company’s own input, performs 
better compared to a more generic approach.
As each company has unique business characteristics and a unique set of clients, it is expected that 
a company’s own contribution is essential in the modelling of its client firms’ payment behavior 
1 See for instance Wilson, Summers and Hope (2000) for research on the use of a German payment 
index, Paydex. 
2 Asiakastieto Ltd calls their letter ratings as Rating Alfa: the ratings vary from the highest score AAA 
to the lowest score C.
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or payment difficulties, in addition to external data provided by a rating agency. This paper also 
analyzes the differences between poor payment behavior, defined by a ‘payment failure event’, 
and an actual default in payments; a firm that constantly pays its bills late may well have a healthy 
balance sheet and no reported defaults in payments – it might simply use its scale of economics 
to profit from other investment opportunities that more than cover the expenses of paying late. 
Thus a firm that systematically pays its bills after the due date may as well be a financially stable 
firm with merely a bad habit. However it is as likely that poor paying habits are related to weak 
financials and signal upcoming financial distress. The purpose of this study is to examine whether 
payment failure, measured with unregistered and systematic significantly late payments, can 
be related to financial difficulties measured by selected financial ratios and Asiakastieto Ltd’s 
scores, and whether it can be predicted with payment history. This thesis is expected to provide 
useful insights for the development of a leading Finnish credit rating agency Asiakastieto Ltd’s 
credit rating system. However the results of this study may be used for the development of any 
independent rating system as they all cover fundamentally the same principles (Saraç, 2010). 
My empirical tests proceed as follows; firstly using the binary regression framework, I analyze the 
probability of systematic and severe payment delays. I relate the likelihood of failure to pay on 
time3 to the variables used to describe the client firms’ background, financials and past payment 
behavior. Secondly, I test whether payment history variables derived from the ledger data possess 
the most prediction power in payment failure prediction, even relative to the background and 
financial variables. Moreover, I study the combinations of different types of variables, as there 
may be differences in the classification accuracy of the models depending on how well each type 
of data links to the dependent variable chosen.
First, I describe the main differences between the types of independent variables and the study’s 
definition of failure, compared to prior literature, and second I analyze the effects of different 
3 From here onwards failure to pay on time is replaced by “payment failure” or simply “failure” in the 
discourse of this thesis. Thus firms that cross a certain limit of late payments set by Company X, are 
denoted as failed while others are denoted as non-failed.
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variable combinations in the binary logistic regression framework in more detail. Finally, I 
compare the results of different models and analyze which combinations of variables perform 
best together and which information is the most accurate in payment failure prediction.
1.2 Agenda of the Paper
This study seeks to examine the use of ledger data in payment behavior prediction and the 
possible pros of the new approach compared to the traditional models using primarily financial 
variables. Furthermore, I extend the research on corporate failure prediction with non-financial 
variables and test whether the use of client firms’ recent payment history is able to increase the 
accuracy of a credit risk model based on general information on the same clients. The goal of 
the research is, using the binary logistic framework4, to analyze the probability of an individual 
client firm failing in its payments; the status of a poor payer, denoted as a failed firm, is the 
dependent variable. The dependent variable ‘payment failure’ takes the value of one (1) if a 
client firm continuously5 pays its bills more than 30 days late, and zero (0) otherwise.
Many prior studies use liquidating bankruptcy or reorganization as the definition of failure6 
while others define failure according to the Basel II framework; a borrower is in default if any 
payment related to the loan is more than 90 days overdue (Jappelli & Pagano, 2000; Kocenda 
& Vojtek, 2009). Considering this, the customers defined as failed in this study, that is, firms 
4 Prior studies have introduced both logistic and hazard models to study corporate failure. Hill, Perry and 
Andes (1996) argue that movement across company health and financial distress is a dynamic process 
that consequently requires a dynamic methodology to explain it. For example Turetsky and McEwen 
(2001) use a Cox proportional hazard model, and Shumway (2001) emphasizes that hazard models are 
more consistent and accurate than single-period models. Due to the unique nature of the data and its 
origin, single-period study is the only possibility for this study. However, this technique is widely used 
and it has been able to yield significant results in the past (See e.g. Back, 2005).
5 “Continuously” has been defined as a delay in a payment of at least 30 days following the bill’s due 
date and taking place at least three times during June 2011 – May 2012. This definition of payment 
failure is based on Company X’s costs of collection and monitoring versus its profits of interest on late 
payments. It is hypothesized that the collection procedure of three times turns the profitability of an 
individual customer to negative, at least in the short term. 
6 See, among others, Altman (1968), Platt and Platt (1991), Chava and Jarrow (2004). 
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that pay at least three of their bills at least 30 days after the due date, during one calendar year, 
would not necessarily default in the Basel II framework. Thus all results of this paper are not 
directly comparable with the previous literature.7 In Back (2005)’s study, failure is divided 
into four different categories as follows: (1) bankrupt firms; (2) reorganized firms; (3) firms 
with recorded payment disturbances; and (4) firms with payment delays, in order to give more 
room for different types and gravities of failure.  Additionally, Beaver (1966) defines failure 
as a firm’s inability to pay its financial obligations as they mature, including firms faced with 
bankruptcy.
This study differs from prior research with respect to methodology, variables and empirical 
data. In this paper, all models are estimated using the logistic regression analysis, as shown by 
Hopwood et al. (1989), Keasey and Watson (1987) and Wilson et. al. (2000), among others. 
Firstly, the main argument of this study is that data on recent payment history gathered from a 
corporate ledger not only bring additional information to financial variables but are also more 
accurate in predicting future payment behavior – payment failure in the context of this study – 
as the data are up-to-date and not prone to ‘window-dressing’ or other accounting modification. 
Moreover, payment failure might not be directly linked to financial distress so that predicting 
it with traditional methods and variables might not work; a dilemma this study attempts to 
solve.
Secondly, this paper employs a uniquely measured dependent variable to describe failure. On 
the one hand payment difficulties and defaults are milder and more common forms of financial 
distress compared to bankruptcy. On the other hand, payment delays may be a step towards 
bankruptcy or reorganization if a firm’s financial condition deteriorates. (Laitinen & Laitinen, 
2009). Furthermore, payments delays may be a sign of a firm’s way of using trade credit as a 
short-term loan (Wilson & Summers, 2000). If this is the case, payment behavior should not 
7 See the test of robustness in Section 4.3 that analyzes the prediction power of ledger variables in the 
Basel II context.
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directly correlate with poor financials – especially as firms tend to use trade credit less during 
times of financial crises, that is, financial difficulties do not seem to lead to increased use of this 
type of “extended credit” (see, for example, Lundmark, 2012). This thesis analyzes whether 
a unique and interactive approach in offering credit risk rating services better captures the 
risk among a company’s clientele. This interactive approach uses a failure definition by the 
case company itself and uses the company’s ledger data to add up to an existing model based 
on external data. The dependent variable, payment failure, is defined according to the case 
company’s definition of a client relationship’s short-term profitability. This thesis aims to find 
factors behind the early signs of a client firm becoming unprofitable – a firm paying its bills 
at least 30 days late at least three times within a year, due to either financial difficulties or a 
behavioral pattern is denoted as, at least temporarily, unprofitable and thus failed.
A practical ‘customer-friendly’ approach is used to analyze the importance of individual 
adjustment in rating modelling, based on a rating agency’s customer company’s clientele, 
industry and ledger data. As further discussed in Section 3.2, each company has clients paying 
it better or worse compared to its competitors, due to reasons the company cannot influence. 
It is typical especially in the construction field, in which the case company operates, that a 
company at the end of a construction project lifecycle is paid less likely on time compared to a 
company at the beginning of the cycle as the most essential products are purchased first; failure 
to pay a company selling the most vital products would most likely end the entire project. As 
each company’s clientele can be assumed to behave differently, it is expected that a unique 
approach is more accurate in payment behavior prediction.8 More specifically, this paper aims 
to analyze the contribution that a company’s own ledger data can make to rating scores produced 
by Asiakastieto Ltd, currently using variables derived from financial and background variables 
and to some extent using external companies’ ledger data as well. In this study, the definition 
8 However, the sharing of private credit information could significantly facilitate credit decisions 
concerning new client firms; even if firms would on average pay better to Company Z than Company Y, 
Company Y is yet able to use the information in the shared pool for its own decision making to decide 
if a firm seeking finance pays well enough considering the possible standard errors due to the life cycle 
effect of its own products.
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of failure is case-company related and unique; thus it is hypothesized that the use of the case 
company’s own ledger improves the prediction power of the current rating scores based on 
external data.
Thirdly, this study uses a set of variables computed from corporate ledger data, which enables a 
unique viewpoint into firms’ payment behavior that is not generally accessible. Moreover, many 
previous studies have been limited by a small sample size; Wilson et al. (2000) use one of the 
largest samples traced with over 7,000 firms and argue it to be “almost an order of magnitude 
larger than existing published studies in this area”.9 However, Laitinen and Laitinen (2009) use 
a sample significantly larger with an estimation sample of some 2,300 firms and a test sample of 
more than 48,000 firms. Nevertheless, the sample size used in this paper with over 7,000 firms 
is significantly larger than the average dataset used in prior empirical studies in the field. A large 
sample better represents the whole corporate population and thus facilitates the building and 
testing of “generic models” (Wilson et al., 2000).
Finally, the sample has two other unique features; the data comes from a Finnish company’s 
corporate ledger, and the results have implications especially in the construction industry because 
of the nature of the case company’s business. There is neither any published empirical paper 
traced using ledger data in corporate payment behavior prediction nor any study that predicts 
payment behavior using a sample of Finnish firms’ billing transactions.10 This is understandable 
as companies may be reluctant to give their billing information for the use of science. Therefore, 
the sample of this study has also pioneering significance, as the use of ledger data in corporate 
failure prediction in past literature is minuscule. 
9 Altman et al. (1994) use data of over 1000 Italian firms and describe the sample size as “by far the 
largest of any distressed prediction study to date”.
10 There are a number of Finnish studies investigating the probability of default but no academic research 
was traced in Finland with a clear focus on the short term profitability of corporate clients (see, for 
example, Laitinen, 1999, Back, 2005, and Laitinen & Laitinen, 2009). Additionally, Lawrence and 
Smith (1992) study the use of payment history variables, computed from credit accounts, in loan default 
prediction in the home mortgages and consumer credit context.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the extant literature on 
the role of credit rating agencies, corporate failure prediction and payment behavior modelling, 
and describes more closely how this paper differs from the previous studies in the field. 
Additionally, theory on asymmetric information, relationship lending and information sharing 
is discussed. Section 3 describes the data, hypotheses, the use of variables and the empirical 
approach. In Section 4, I present the models developed in this study and their results, which are 
then discussed further in the concluding Section 5.
2 Literature Review
This study differs from the existing literature in three important ways. Firstly, instead of 
analyzing the likelihood of bankruptcy or publicly registered default, I create a model that 
helps identify customers that turn unprofitable even before severe consequences such as 
registered payment defaults, bankruptcy or reorganization. It is widely known that lenders are 
likely to be left somewhat empty-handed in the case of a bankruptcy of their borrower; thus 
identifying troubled payment behavior in advance is vital. Secondly, this study is focused on 
the construction sector where both the cyclicality of the economy and the lifecycle impact of 
the business itself have a large effect on the payment behavior of client firms. Finally, I use a 
unique and confidential business-to-business (hereafter B2B) trade credit customer billing data 
from one large Finnish company.11 This enables studying firms’ payment history and client firm-
creditor firm relationships’ length carefully. While prior studies (see, for example, Back, 2005) 
have used payment disturbances, such as reported failed attempts to collect debt at maturity, in 
predicting default, this study extends the work of similar studies by providing signs of earlier 
delinquencies which are not likely to be registered or filed and are consequently hidden from 
the public. Back (2005) also uses unregistered delays to predict loan default of some 3,000 
firms; however, the information of payment delays is gathered by Asiakastieto Ltd’s analysts’ 
11 Later on referred to as Company X. Company X operates in the construction field but it has clients 
also from other sectors.
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company interviews, thus, no similar level of accuracy compared to real-time ledger data are 
presented in his study. A customer, whose unpaid bills are failed to be collected, or collected at 
a very high cost12, is a true credit risk for a company. The aim of this paper is to predict payment 
failure using payment history, financial statements and background information, to help the 
development of credit rating models towards the early identification of a troubled corporate 
client.
2.1 Literature on the Role of Credit Rating Agencies
External rating services were first introduced in the 19th century in the U.S with the idea that 
a rating could develop a formal relationship between the borrower and the creditor (Saraç, 
2010). Banks adopted internal ratings during the nineties to alleviate loan approval, pricing 
and monitoring, for instance (Grunert, Norden & Weber, 2005). Hazar and Babuscu (2007) 
define rating as an instrument that measures the ability and likelihood of a borrower to repay 
its loan on time and as agreed upon, that is, a borrower’s solvency. Saraç (2010) describes 
credit rating as a more elaborate and institutionalized form of conventional financial analysis 
process. The rating process “consists of the investigation, evaluation and classification of 
firms or capital market institutions in terms of organization, liquidity, solvency, profitability 
and financial structure with the consideration of industrial, economical, political and social 
conditions” (Official Gazette, 6 March 1997, as cited by Saraç, 2010). A rating provides an 
objective indicator of each firm seeking capital. Financial institutions and other investors, 
or in the context of this study Company X, are able to base their credit terms, interest 
rates, expected returns and other details on these ratings. Risk premiums assigned to each 
firm are largely affected by their rating scores (Saraç, 2010). Moreover, the use of rating 
score services has increased since the growing variety of financial instruments (Standard & 
Poor’s Credit Week, 1989). Grunert et al. (2005) suggests that ratings can be interpreted as 
12 See discussion on the dependent variable in Subsection 1.2. Company X defines a client firm that pays 
at least three of its bills at least 30 days after the due date, within a calendar year, as failed due to fixed 
collection costs and increased monitoring linked to troubled paying.
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a screening technology used to alleviate problems between a borrower and a lender arising 
from asymmetric information.
The modern theory of financial intermediation explains the need for intermediaries, such as 
banks, credit rating agencies and advisory financial service providers, by a reduction in costs 
of asymmetric information (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 
1993). Tang (2006) suggests that rating agencies help to diminish opacity of information in 
the credit markets through disclosure of new information, thereby influencing firms’ access to 
financing and their investment decisions. The paper shows a drop (increase) in cost of borrowing 
for firms that were upgraded (downgraded).
The importance of credit ratings has increased in recent years due to growing demand and 
regulation. Especially banks are faced with higher risk management requirements through Basel 
II regulations (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), which oblige that the evaluation of 
credit risk is based on risk ratings. However, credit ratings are useful tools also in, for example, 
credit portfolio management of any company. The new legislation has already significantly 
increased the use of credit scoring by banks (Bofondi & Lotti, 2006). Improvements on the 
accuracy of credit ratings are important for the prevention of credit crunches arising from an 
alarming extent of systematic risk. Moreover, some researchers expect a rating to become a 
prerequisite for obtaining finance in the future (see e.g. Saraç, 2010). On the other hand, the 
financial crisis of 2008-2010 has damaged the image of rating agencies. As well known, the 
U.S agencies were overly optimistic in their rating of products linked to subprime mortgages, 
and again, the financial markets put too much reliance on their ratings’ accuracy (See, also, 
Longstaff, 2010).
Some investors believe that rating agencies are slow to adjust their ratings. Rating agencies 
have a long term time horizon in their ratings opposite to an investor, or a company, who wishes 
to receive up-to-date information. (Altman and Rijken, 2004). One solution could be the use of 
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new variables, such as ledger data variables, that are updated daily in addition to the traditional 
financial variables that are updated on a yearly or quarterly base. In addition to ratings, credit 
rating agencies appear to have expanded their role from pure information services to monitoring 
(Boot, Milbourn & Schmeits, 2006; Bannier & Hirsch, 2010). A payment behavior register of 
recent payment delays, updated using a pool of corporate ledgers, would significantly expand 
the accuracy of short-term information about the client firms in the pool. 
Although all rating agencies put weight to publicly available financial information, rating 
agencies have different rating scales and thus they may give different scores to the same 
company (Cantor & Packer, 1997; Bongaerts, Cremers & Goetzmann, 2012). Tabakis and 
Vinci (2002) suggest that the information credit rating agencies use to create their scoring 
system can be divided into a core part, based on information publicly available, and a 
subjective part called an analyst’s contribution. The writers show that while the largest 
U.S. agencies studied in the paper had no significant differences in the predicted default 
probabilities given a rating, the agencies did display significant differences in their rating 
of a given set of credit institutions. Thus rating accuracy is not only based on financial 
information available to all players but also on a specific analyst contribution of knowledge 
not available to others. If this knowledge is well used, it may well prove to be a significant 
competitive advantage for a credit rating agency. My model tries to find ways to improve 
an existing model, used to assign rating scores, with data that updates significantly more 
often compared to the traditionally used information.
Only a few researchers have focused on studying credit ratings, and a majority of these are 
implemented with U.S data and focus on the ratings of the three largest rating agencies: 
Moody’s Investor Service, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch.13 I test the prediction ability of 
both financial and non-financial variables compared to Asiakastieto Ltd’s rating scores, 
13 See, for example, Tabakis and Vinci (2002), Tang (2006) and Bongaerts, Cremers & Goetzmann, 
(2012) for empirical comparison of the largest credit agencies and Saraç (2010) for an analysis of the 
accuracy of credit analysts’ estimates.
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to examine possible ways to improve the generic current rating model towards a more 
interactive approach. Back (2005), Laitinen (1999) and Laitinen and Laitinen (2009) among 
others have also used data from Asiakastieto Ltd but their studies differ from mine in two 
ways.
First, the previous work utilizing Asiakastieto Ltd’s database predicts primarily severe 
results of financial difficulties, that is, bankruptcy and restructuring or officially registered 
payment defaults. Second, the data of these past studies are gathered by the credit analysts 
of Asiakastieto Ltd mainly from financial statements and thus, for example, problems linked 
to the time lag between the measurement of the independent and dependent variables are 
prominent (see, for example, Back, 2005). The data used in my study are daily ledger data 
from a Finnish company, which enables the measurement of variables with no lag. The only 
study traced using corporate ledger data is by Hassler, Myers and Seldin (1963). Hassler et 
al. (1963) build a numerical scoring system to predict later account delinquencies among 
600 credit consumer customers of a large Los Angeles department store chain. The reason 
for the rare use of companies’ transaction data in prior literature is that ledger information 
is often highly confidential and companies are carefully examining the projects they choose 
to participate in. This thesis is the first study to-date using ledger data to predict payment 
delays at the corporate level, and one of the few academic contributions to literature on 
payment behavior prediction.
2.2 Discussion on Corporate Failure Prediction
First, the following chapter discusses the use of financial variables in previous papers in 
the field. Second, the role of non-financial variables and ‘soft’ information in credit risk 
literature is presented. Finally, I analyse prior empirical studies’ different definitions of the 
dependent variable, used to describe the extent and severity of corporate failure. 
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2.2.1 The Use of Financial Variables in Failure Prediction
Previous studies have widely adopted the use of financial ratios in distress prediction since the 
pioneering work of Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968). Empirical studies on financial distress 
prediction have traditionally been based on financial information (see, for example, Zavgren, 
1985; Jones, 1987; Laitinen & Kankaanpää, 1999; Jones & Hensher, 2004; Altman & Hotchkiss, 
2006; Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006; and Lensberg et al., 2006). However, the reliability and accuracy 
of financial statements have been under scrutiny especially after cases such as the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals (Saraç, 2010). The increasing use of accounting loopholes, special purpose 
vehicles and the lack of transparent financial reporting is making the utilisation of financial 
statement data less reliable.
Saraç (2010) posits that firms are forced to conceal some of their assets, liabilities or income to 
reduce tax or other burdens. Furthermore, companies are prone to “window-dressing” despite 
advanced regulations attempting to abolish it (Saraç, 2010). Nevertheless, financial variables 
have a stable role in financial distress prediction and their use is widely accepted. Empirical 
evidence shows that especially financial ratios implying high leverage, inefficiency or poor 
liquidity increase the probability of bankruptcy (See e.g. Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968; Gordon, 
1971; Altman et al., 1977; Ohlson, 1980; Chen and Shimerda, 1981; Lau, 1987; Gilson, 
1989, 1990; Gilbert et al., 1990; Platt and Platt, 1990; Anyane-Ntow, 1991; Chan and Chen, 
1991; Flagg, Giroux and Wiggins, 1991; Chen and Lee, 1993; Shumway, 2001; Turetsky and 
McEwen, 2001). Gilbert et al. (1990) show that cash flow variables have significant explanatory 
power in insolvency prediction. On the other hand, Ward (1994) finds cash flow variables 
useful in studying mining, oil and gas industries and suggests that cash flow information is 
industry specific.  Scott (1981), Jones (1987) and Laitinen (1991) add cash flow, firm size and 
growth to the list of significant variables in terms of both theory and empirical evidence. Other 
studies find profitability measures such as return on sales to reflect firm longevity (Altman, 
1968; Altman et al., 1977; Chen and Shimerda, 1981; Moses and Liao, 1987; Gilbert et al., 
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1990; Gilson, 1990; Flagg et al., 1991) while others find only weak relation between some 
profitability variables and financial distress (Turetsky and McEwen, 2001; Saraç, 2010).
Some modern studies question the use of financial ratios due to their unavailability for non-
listed firms and announcement only once a year (small firms) or quarterly (listed firms). 
According to Saraç (2010), the financial statements of small and medium enterprises (SME) 
cannot be relied on exclusively because they do not reveal all information or reflect it 
accurately.   Additionally, studies such as Altman (1968) posit that the averages of financial 
ratios shift over time. Naturally the situation of a firm may change rather fast after reporting 
its financial statements. Thus the predictive power of financial ratios decreases the longer the 
time lag between the measurement of these variables and the time of the failure.
According to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000), models based on purely 
financial factors have some disadvantages. Financial factors are mainly backward-looking 
point-in-time measures so that models based on financial variables are constrained and may 
not perform out-of-sample (Grunert et al., 2005).14 Concurrently, as financial factors are 
measured in the same way by banks and credit agencies, non-financial factors may explain a 
firm’s different rating scores among different intermediaries or creditors (See, also, Grunert et 
al. (2005). Moreover, a firm may receive a positive response from one lender while a negative 
one from another due to asymmetric information; a longer client relationship generates 
valuable information to the creditor (see, also, Berger & Udell, 1995; Sharpe, 1990). Krahner 
and Weber (2001) define credit rating as a “mixture of mathematical models and management 
intuition” and underline the essential link between a rating and the likelihood of failure. 
Nevertheless, weights given to different financial and non-financial factors, and the rating 
scores separating a poorly performing firm from a financially stable one, are decisions each 
14 Inherently many non-financial variables are subjectively measured and thus similar problems may 
arise. For instance the limit of late payments that makes a client firm unprofitable is different across 
companies, industries and time. Additionally, the definition of payment failure may vary across cases. 
These issues require consideration when applying the results of this study.
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rating agency make individually. Although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
has given a proposal for banks to use their internal credit ratings to calculate regulatory risk 
weights, these regulations do not have direct implications on the rating system of credit rating 
agencies.
2.2.2 The Use of Non-financial Variables in Failure Prediction
Only a minority of previous studies relate non-financial variables’ role to financial difficulties. 
Keasey and Watson (1987) use non-financial variables such as audit qualifications, number and 
change in directors and reporting lags, both alone and together with financial ratios to analyze 
their role in small firm failure. The writers suggest that non-financial variables have slightly 
better prediction power compared to traditionally used financial variables. Also Laitinen (1999) 
finds support for the use of non-financial variables such as payment history and properties 
of the management in risk scoring estimation. A number of prior studies focus on the use of 
financial and non-financial variables in testing banks’ internal rating system (see, among others, 
Grunert et al., 2005; Saraç, 2010). Saraç (2010) finds subjective criteria, such as an analyst’s 
own evaluation of shareholders and directors or industry, to be more effective than financial 
criteria in predicting loan repayment performance. The writer argues that analysts can assess 
a firm better if they do not rely solely on financial statements. Similar results are reported 
by Grunert et al. (2005) who study German companies and find qualitative variables such as 
accounting behavior to help classify companies correctly. Furthermore, Brunner et al. (2000) 
study qualitative and quantitative ratings and find the former to perform better; for example 
rating changes derive mostly from the changes in the “soft” sub-ratings, and ratings based 
on “soft” information show better grades with less dispersion around their means.  Also the 
importance of qualitative information on relationship building has been studied (Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan & Stein, 2002; Stein, 2002).
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2.2.3 Prior Research on Financial Distress Prediction – The Traditional Definitions of Failure
Financial distress is widely defined as bankruptcy or reorganization (Altman, 1968; Giroux & 
Wiggins, 1983) whilst financial distress has been thought to stand for business failure (See e.g., 
Altman, 1968; Altman et al., 1977; Ball & Foster, 1982; Moses & Liao, 1987). Grunert et al. 
(2005) use the Basel II definition of default as the dependent variable in their study (see Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001).15 John (1993) defines financial distress as a point 
in time when the liquid assets of a firm do not sufficiently cover the current requirements of its 
contracts. However, according to Giroux and Wiggins (1983), bankruptcy is only one event in 
the financial distress process of a troubled firm. All distress events from decreased cash flows to 
payment difficulties or bankruptcy reflect firm risk (Turetsky & McEwen, 2001). Additionally, 
Foster (1986) describes financial distress as a continuum of many points of failure. Other 
studies such as Pastena and Ruland (1986), Lau (1987), Gilbert et al. (1990), Anyane-Ntow 
(1991), Johnsen and Melicher (1994), and Ward and Foster (1997) suggest there are numerous 
heterogonous characteristics for financial difficulties in between the healthy and bankrupt stages 
of a firm’s lifecycle.
The signals of a firm’s decline from healthy towards distressed are events such as technical or 
loan default, reduction in dividend payments or debt restructuring (Giroux and Wiggins, 1983, 
1984; Lau, 1987; Flagg et al., 1991; Aksu, 1993; Chen and Lee, 1993). Furthermore, Turetsky 
and McEwen (2001) suggest that one of the initial signs of a financial distress and failure process 
is the change from positive to negative in the cash flow from continuing operations. In fact, 
Gilbert et al. (1990) argues that only a fraction of companies faced with financial difficulties 
file for bankruptcy. Thus, there may be factors motivating financial distress different from those 
that are related to bankruptcy. A company may fail to pay its bills on time but never go nearly 
15 The Basel II definition of default is as follows: (i) the bank considers that the obligor is unlikely to 
pay its credit obligations to the bank in full, without recourse by the bank to actions such as realizing 
collateral (if held); or (ii) the obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to 
the bank.
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as far as bankrupt. A study that has a narrow definition of failure will fail to capture all events 
where a client relationship turns unprofitable without the client firm filing for restructuring or 
bankruptcy, for instance.
2.2.4 Prior Research on Payment Behavior Prediction – The Less Severe Definitions of Failure
Few prior studies predict payment behavior instead of publicly registered business failure; the only 
academic study traced with a clear focus on future payment behavior prediction at the corporate 
level is by Wilson, Summers and Hope (2000) with UK data. Wilson et al. (2000) show that 
payment behavior is more accurate in failure prediction than traditionally used accounting data. 
Wilson et al. (2000) study the use of payment history (Paydex index) in predicting future payment 
delays. The writers use payment delays instead of an officially registered payment default as their 
dependent variable and test two outcomes16 describing financial difficulties, or payment delays, 
somewhat similar in the severity of the outcome modeled in this study. The writers show that prior 
payment behavior has significantly more explanatory power compared to accounting data alone 
in predicting future payment difficulties and impending failure. Wilson et al. argue that recent 
payment history not only predicts accurately payment delays but it is also significantly related 
to looming, more severe, failure. Moreover, the writers suggest that accounting information is 
less predictive for payment behavior than it is for serious corporate failure as accounting data is 
infrequent compared to a firm’s payment cycle. This thesis focuses on the payment information to 
find the hidden information that accounting data are unable to capture. Furthermore, in this study, 
the definition of the dependent variable, as well as the use of ledger data in variable creation and 
payment failure prediction, differs from any other paper to date.
Whereas occurrence of payment difficulties can be both seen as the first sign of financial troubles 
(see e.g. Back, 2005), or even a measure of distress in advance of a possible bankruptcy filing 
16 Two outcomes modelled are firms paying on average (1) 15 or more days late or (2) 30 or more days 
late, for one or more of the next 6 months. 
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(Ward & Foster, 1997), payment history can also be a sign of a behavioral pattern in which 
case studying bankruptcy, reorganization or any other public measures of default may not be 
useful in predicting how profitable or unprofitable a client is to a company, and the likelihood 
of the business relationship turning unprofitable. A customer that has zero registered defaults 
in its credit payments or one that never goes bankrupt can still become an unprofitable client 
due to payment delays and the fixed costs that collection procedures and increased monitoring 
generate. 
I investigate whether publicly available financial information, past registered payment defaults 
and other background information can be used to predict the likelihood of a client firm failing to 
pay on time. More importantly, I study whether past late payments are related to future payment 
failure. Results in this area could be useful to any company with clientele of small enterprises 
that has no wide access to registered data on for example financial statements or past defaults. 
In addition to possible collection costs that payments failures generate, payment difficulties or 
late payments may only be the beginning towards bankruptcy; Turetsky and McEwen (2001) 
and Wilson et al. (2000) document that failure to pay on time is positively associated with 
impending failure such as bankruptcy. Moreover, Deloof (2003) studies the working capital 
management of large Belgian companies and finds that less profitable firms wait longer to 
pay their bills. On the one hand, it could be that the use of trade credit for a short-term loan is 
more a last-resort solution for large firms in financial distress rather than a signal of effective 
management of a successful company, at least in the light of Deloof (2003). On the other hand, 
companies with strong financial records may be poor payers also for convenience reasons; a 
late payment can be treated as the use of extended credit to maximize efficient working capital 
management, or a firm might take advantage over an investment possibility and rather pay 
interest on late payments than give up that opportunity (see, also, Wilson & Summers, 2000).
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2.3 Theory on Informational Problems and Information Sharing
The extant literature analyzes generally the credit decision making of banks and the 
informational problems of lending (See, among others, Jappelli & Pagano, 1993; 1999; 
2000). However, similar problems arise also outside the banking world; companies offering 
trade credit and intermediaries such as credit rating companies are faced with problems 
of asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection and agency problems. The 
following chapter describes the literature around the problems of information and its 
communication. Although prior literature is mainly focused on the banking industry, similar 
problems and events take place also in the trade credit context. The chapter proceeds as 
follows. Firstly, theoretical background on information opacity is presented. Secondly, 
literature on relationship lending is described. Finally, research on the theory of information 
sharing is reviewed. Furthermore, I analyze the implications of each theoretical framework 
on this study.
2.3.1 Asymmetric Information and Cost of Lending – Implications for Credit Risk 
Management
In case of new clients, assuming no information is shared and no external services used, a 
company has to base its credit decisions purely on publicly available and sometimes rather 
old information. Moreover, as discussed earlier, even a firm with strong financials might 
be a poor payer and thus an unprofitable client. Information asymmetries may lead to a 
‘lemon’s problem’, introduced by Akerlof (1970); a seller knows more about a product 
than the buyer. The theory is applicable to credit markets as well: a lender knows less 
about a borrower’s payment behavior than the borrower. With no information about a new 
prospective client’s payment history, costs of misclassification, that is, Type I and Type II 
errors, can lead to costly decisions.17 Moreover, many creditors base their credit decisions 
17 Type I error occurs when failing firms are unintentionally granted credit and Type II error takes place 
when non-failing firms are inadvertently denied credit (Stein, 2005).
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only on the financial health of firms while behavioral patterns are overlooked, partly due 
to lack of information.
In imperfect markets with asymmetric information, a borrower may have an incentive not to 
pay on time, assuming that the borrower’s past late payments are not severe enough to be 
publicly registered and the borrower’s reputation stays intact.  If, however, information about 
the borrower’s payment history is shared among lenders, his reputation is in question and he 
is more likely not to fail in his payments (see, also, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000). Credit ratings 
generated from a large pool of corporate ledgers and shared accordingly might significantly 
reduce information asymmetry and the lemon’s problem with new clients and consequently 
increase liquidity in the credit markets.
2.3.2 Relationship Lending – Implications for Failure Prediction
According to the adverse selection model developed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993), information 
sharing decreases payment failures and improves the pool of borrowers (See, also, Jappelli & 
Pagano, 1999, for cross-country evidence). In the model, as in the real world, market players 
have more information about their long-standing clients than about credit seekers who have 
newly moved into the market. Creditors are more prone to adverse selection in the case of the 
latter group; however, exchange of private information by market players helps to mitigate the 
problem and decrease failure rates.
Berger and Udell (1995) find that longer banking relationships solve problems of asymmetric 
information and conclude that relationship lending generates valuable information about the 
quality of borrowers. Sharpe (1990) suggests that longer client relationships allow lenders to 
benefit from this information asymmetry by capturing “rents” generated by these clients. He also 
argues that a new client is expected to initially generate losses. A longer relationship reduces 
the ‘hidden’ knowledge about a borrower, and this accumulated knowledge over competitors 
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allows the lender to make credit decisions according to all relevant information and gain an 
advantage over its competitors, that is, gain from information asymmetries in the market. 
An interesting question is, in the discourse of these theories, whether client firms with long 
business relationships with Company X, and a reputation to protect, will in fact fail to pay 
on time less frequently. Assuming that client relationship age is inversely related to hidden 
information from Company X, and that it can be used as a proxy for the level of monitoring 
through client meetings, for instance, clients with longer client firm–creditor firm relations 
should have better paying habits. Additionally, treating firm age as a proxy for its reputation, 
older firms should be associated with payment failure less often.18 On the other hand, it might 
as well be that smaller firms are monitored more closely due to their assumed higher risk and 
thus adverse selection might be higher among larger firms.19
2.3.3 Theory on Information Sharing – Implications for Future Credit Rating Systems
Jappelli and Pagano (2000) study information sharing in credit markets from banks’ perspective 
and conclude that as all data needed for credit screening and monitoring is not available, banks 
face adverse selection and moral hazard problems in their lending activity. Adverse selection 
arises when there is hidden information about borrowers’ characteristics, and it can lead to 
inefficient allocation of credit.
Moral hazard means the opportunistic behavior of a borrower when there is too little monitoring 
by the lender. Both problems can be mitigated with a requirement of collateral or an equity stake 
in the project by the borrower. Also a requirement for a borrower’s fine reputation helps align 
a borrower’s incentives with those of the creditor; a borrower is more likely to pay on time in 
the fear of reputation loss. (Jappelli & Pagano, 2000). Equity stakes and collateral requirements 
18 For example Lerner (1994), Gompers (1996), Gompers and Lerner (1999a) and Nahata (2008) have 
related firm age to experience and reputation.
19 See Subsection 3.3.2 for discussion on smaller firms’ assumed higher risk.
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are often not available for many companies offering trade credit; so is the case for Company X. 
Thus monitoring and close business relationships with customers are even more critical, so is 
the signalling of a good reputation by a client firm paying on credit.
According to Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980), information asymmetries can be reduced 
through signalling – this is however at a cost. Whereas Ross (1977) argues that in some cases 
the financial structure of a firm may serve as a signal, Haugen and Senbet (1978) posit that 
signalling through strong financials is costly. Nevertheless, because of the moral hazard problem, 
in the absence of a credible signal of a borrower’s quality, both lender and borrower carry the 
agency costs of information asymmetry (Barnea et. al, 1980).
More specifically, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) suggest that exchanging information about 
borrowers has four positive effects. Firstly, it allows more accurate repayment prediction and 
eases adverse selection problems. Secondly, it reduces the “information rent” charged from a 
borrower due to the superior information that the lender has over its competitors. Thirdly, it 
works as a borrower discipline device by reducing moral hazard as the threat of losing one’s 
reputation with all potential lenders heightens a borrower’s incentive to pay on time.  Finally, 
information on the overall indebtedness of borrowers is shared and each borrower’s risk of 
taking too much debt is reduced. (Jappelli & Pagano, 2000). Padilla and Pagano (2000) posit 
that borrowers’ incentive to pay increases especially when the information shared concerns past 
payment failures. On the other hand, the writers underline that when more detailed information 
is shared, the result might be opposite.
Based on the positive effects of information sharing, and assuming that ledger data are a 
successful predictor of payment failure, companies could significantly benefit from the use 
of a shared pool of payment behavior information deriving from corporate ledgers. If widely 
accepted and applied, the exchange of private information could reduce the cost of future credit 
crunches for the entire economy. Competition in the market is necessary, however, to prevent 
23 Tuuli Shun / Master´s Thesis (2012)
the increased lending to safe borrowers at the expense of more risky borrowers (Jappelli & 
Pagano, 2000). Additionally, more research is needed in the area to conclude the costs and 
problems of information sharing.
3 Data, Variables and Methodology
Empirical data and descriptive statistics
The data set consists of both in-house data of one large Finnish company’s, Company X’s, B2B 
clients, and Asiakastieto Ltd’s data on general, financial, business field and credit information 
on the same clients firms’ identity numbers. The unique transaction data set of 7741 firms, 
operating in different industry categories, enables a unique empirical analysis of the use of 
ledger data in payment behavior prediction at the corporate level.20
The research follows the payment records of each client firm from January 2010 to May 2012 so 
that the payment behavior of each client is followed from 1st of January 2010 until 31st of May 
2011 and used to predict the possible payment delays during the following year, 1st of June 2011 
– 31st of May 2012. The data comprise of billing transactions during two years, though Shumway 
(2001) argues that hazard models are more accurate and consistent than single-period studies. 
However, many single period studies have succeeded to contribute to the literature (see, among 
others, Lawrence & Smith, 1992; Wilson et al., 2000; Back, 2005; Laitinen & Laitinen, 2009). By 
combining these two data sets, the probability of each firm’s likelihood of failing in its payments 
is analyzed.21 The empirical study is a snapshot of one specific period of time and thus external 
20 Although the firms in the sample represent different industry categories, they all use Company X’s 
equipment and a majority of client firms operate in the construction sector; thus the sample best represents 
the Finnish construction market. However, the thesis offers a viewpoint into possible differences in 
between these industry categories’ payment behavior.
21 Payment failure, defined by Company X, is the dependent variable in the binary logistic regression, 
and it takes the value of one if a firm pays at least three of its bills at least 30 days after the due date 
during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero otherwise.
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factors such as economic situation in the business field may affect the results.22
The following types of information from Asiakastieto Ltd’s database are used to predict future 
payment behavior, that is, payment failure:
1. General information about each client: firm age, past bad credits and defaults on payments, 
notes of past reorganization or bankruptcy
2. Financial information: liquidity, leverage and profitability measures
3. Business field information: industry category, industry’s propensity to default (%)
4. Risk rating information: letter credit ratings by Asiakastieto Ltd
The following information from Company X’s database is used to add up to the model. The goal 
of the research is to study whether these variables can be used to improve the current risk rating 
model of Asiakastieto Ltd, that is, whether a model adding payment record data of actual clients 
to Asiakastieto Ltd’s data on the same clients, has better explanation power than a model solely 
based on external financial and background information.
1. General information: date of first purchase by each client, client ‘status’ information 
2. Transaction information: all billing transactions by each client including purchase dates, 
amount of payments due, amount of payments unpaid, due dates and payment dates of each bill, 
debt collection letter information
After restricting the data to active23 B2B client firms only, and after removing the ’VIP’ clients, 
that is, very large client firms with extraordinary collection procedure due to their purchase 
22 Economic cycles in the sectors are captured by a variable describing the risk factor in each firm’s 
business field, or industry propensity to default (%), named ‘Industry_risk’, measured by Asiakastieto 
Ltd at the end of 2010.
23 Client firms that have made purchases within the previous 12 months from May 2012 backwards are 
considered as active.
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power and thus importance as a client, the data consists of some 197,600 bills from January 
2010 to May 2011 and some 225,600 bills from June 2011 to May 2012. The billing data from 
the first time period are used to calculate the independent variables describing payment history, 
and the transactions one year later are used to define the possible ‘payment failure status’ of 
each firm. In other words, payment delays during January 2010 – May 2011 are used to predict 
payment failures taking place during the following year.
After deleting duplicates and matching the data used to calculate the independent variables 
and the dependent variable, the final data were reduced to 7741 client firms: 7512 denoted as 
non-failed and 229 denoted as failed. This sample is divided into 6123 firms with financial 
statement data available and 1618 firms that Asiakastieto Ltd has rated but for which financial 
statement data are missing. I test the prediction power of ledger data variables on two samples 
separately; a sample consisting of firms with all information available (‘reduced sample’ with 
6123 firms) and a sample that uses both firms with financial statement data missing and firms 
used in the reduced sample (‘whole sample’ with 7741 firms). The share of failed firms is some 
3.0% in both samples. In order to use a larger sample with a better representation of Company 
X’s clientele, in the final models I use the whole sample to examine the prediction power of 
payment history variables, and test whether Asiakastieto Ltd’s rating score variables can be 
used to further increase the model’s goodness of fit. 
Figure 1 Panel 1 presents the distribution of different letter credit ratings among the firms used 
in the whole sample of this study, and Panel 2 presents the same distribution among Asiakastieto 
Ltd’s firm data base. Company X has relatively less clients with low rating scores compared to 
the ‘public’, that is, Asiakastieto Ltd’s data base. The lower number of firms with poor rating 
naturally correlates with the somewhat low number of failed firms in the sample; the small 
share of failed firms might also be a sign of the credit limit or credit policy that Company X has 
set for its client firms.
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The model estimations were made as weighted estimations by giving an equal importance to 
both failed and non-failed firms. This procedure leads to two equal size groups of failed and non-
failed client firms in an attempt to give weights to firms in relation to their misclassification costs; 
the cost of misclassifying a failed firm is higher than misclassifying a non-failed one (Laitinen, 
1999).24 Similar technique has been used by Laitinen (1999) in his study for Asiakastieto Ltd 
earlier. Samples with an equal weight on default and non-default firms have also been examined, 
for example, by Keasey and Watson (1987), Hopwood, McKeown and Mutchler (1989) and Koh 
& Killough (1990), and this technique is widely used in credit rating modeling. Oversampling 
of failed firms may lead to biased results; however, this bias is reported to be relatively weak 
and does neither affect the classification rates nor the statistical inferences (Zmijewski, 1984). 
It is a subject of further study, at which level the cutoff value in the binary logistic models 
should be defined to have Type I and Type II errors reflect the true cost of misclassification (See 
discussion in Chapter 4). However, measuring the true cost of payment failure and the cost of 
misclassification are out of the scope of this study.
Moreover, I analyze the firms’ payment behavior and Company X’s credit time allocation over 
the timeframe of the study. I study whether there is a pattern of Company X granting longer 
payment times during specific months of the year but I do not find any evidence of such pattern. 
24 The final models use weighted data of some 7741 (5946) failed and some 7741 (5946) non-failed firms 
for the whole sample tests (reduced sample tests). Some small variation in the sample sizes may appear 
due to missing values; this variation however does not affect the results.
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In addition, I find no significant pattern between the granted payment credit time and the number 
of days firms paid their bills after the due date: the correlation between the days a bill is paid 
after the due date, and credit times granted after purchase until the due date, is only -0.056 
during January 2010 – May 2011 and -0.087 during the following year June 2011 – May 2012. 
Likewise, I find only weak correlation between the sums billed and the credit time granted from 
registration of purchase to due date. Moreover, I find no notable monthly differences within one 
calendar year in purchases made or in their payment times.
One interesting detail is that firms pay significantly better towards the end of the time period 
2010-2012. When restricting the sample to bills not more than 90 days late, no such pattern is 
visible. It seems that the outliers, extremely late received payments, or payment defaults where 
payment has possibly never been made, have significantly reduced during the timeframe of 
this study. The sums of the bills do not show any pattern during a calendar year; purchases are 
made somewhat independent of the time of the year. Thus I find no evidence that firms would be 
more likely to pay on time during certain months of the year. This further reinforces my results 
as it is shown that no external behavioral pattern affects the study that could bias the results. 
Nevertheless, even though no visible pattern exists where purchases would be made during a 
certain time of the year, it does seem that firms purchase more towards the end of each month: 
the data shows a wavy cycle of sums billed growing from the first day of the month until the last 
day of the month. During some months this pattern is more obvious compared to others. 
The billing data consists of both bills that have been paid, either on time or after the due date, and 
bills that were still unpaid in May 2012. The average (median) time firms took to pay their bills after 
the due date is 5.37 (1.00) days for January 2010 – May 2011 and 4.03 (1.00) days for June 2011 – 
May 2012, the difference being statistically significant at the 1% level. This difference is likely due 
to the notable decrease in the extremely late payments and defaults towards the end of the timeframe. 
However, the credit time granted to firms from registration of purchase to due date has also grown: 
this time is on average 16.80 days during January 2010 – May 2011 and 20.89 days one year later, 
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the difference being significant at the 1% level. The median credit times granted, from purchase 
until the due date, for both timeframes is 15.00 days. Naturally more credit time should decrease 
the likelihood of delinquency. However, as discussed earlier, in this sample, credit time granted in 
days since purchase until the due date of the bill, seems to have very weak influence on payment 
behavior.
During January 2010 – May 2011 (June 2011 – May 2012), 83.85% (86.37%) of bills were paid on 
time, that is, before a reminder bill would be sent eight days after the due date. 12.94% (11.41%) 
of bills were paid 8-29 days late and 3.21% (2.22%) were paid at least 30 days after the due 
date. The average sum of bills paid on time is 452.58 (844.53) euro while the average is 531.03 
(1,037.30) euro for 8-29 days late payments and 1,034.53 (1,667.18) euro for bills paid at least 30 
days after due date. It would seem that, on average, smaller bills are paid better than larger ones. 
On the other hand, it might be that firms that purchase with larger amounts pay late more often. 
Medians of purchases made are 172.20 euro for January 2010 – May 2011 and 223.25 euro for 
June 2011 – May 2012.
Models
Seven models are tested using different independent and dependent variables. The independent 
variables are used to develop models consisting of: (1) financial and background variables; (2) 
ledger data variables; (3) credit rating scores and (4) different combinations of (1), (2) and (3). 
The dependent variable used is a payment failure event described earlier; (a) a firm paying at 
least three of its bills at least 30 days after the due date during June 2011 – May 2012 is denoted 
as failed, and consequently the dependent variable takes the value of one (1). In other cases, 
the dependent variable takes the value of zero (0). The seven models are the combinations of 
each set of dependent and independent variables from (1)-(3) and (a). These models and their 
prediction abilities are tested and compared, and their classification accuracies are shown in Model 1 
through Model 6. The dependent variable is measured in all cases from Company X’s ledger data but 
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the combination of the independent variables varies in different Models 1-6.25
3.1 The Choice of Model
Different methods used in prior literature of failure prediction are discriminant analysis (DA) 
or linear discriminant analysis (LDA), linear regression (OLS) and logistic regression (LR). 
Other techniques used are neutral networks (NN) and classification trees (CT). A large number 
of previous empirical studies since Altman (1968) have attempted to create different indices of 
failure proneness (z-score, using discriminant analysis). (Wilson et al., 2000). While the use of 
discriminant analysis has been criticized widely, logit, probit and multilogit estimators have 
avoided some of the problems (see, for example, Aldrich & Nelson, 1984; Lo, 1986; Wilson 
et al., 2000). Desai, Crook and Overstreet (1996) and Arminger, Enache and Bonne (1997) 
compare the models’ prediction power and find both LR and NN the most accurate in failure 
modeling in terms of overall performance. On the other hand, Lee, Chiu, Lu and Chen (2002) 
find no significant difference between the classification rates of the models.
Allen et al. (2004) suggests four different methods most suitable in identifying variables that 
have statistical explanatory power in predicting default; 1) the linear probability model, 2) the 
logit model, 3) the probit model, and 4) the multiple discriminant analysis model. Laitinen 
and Kankaanpää (1999) test six alternative methods’ (LDA, LR, RPA, NN, HIP and survival 
analysis) prediction power in failure prediction with financial ratios and although no superior 
method was found, results show that logistic analysis yield the highest prognostic accuracy with 
89.5%. Also several other studies stand for logistic regression due to its accuracy in empirical 
models (see Lawrence & Arshadi, 1995; Thomas, 2000; Kocenda & Vojtek, 2009). Laitinen 
and Laitinen (2009) use the logistic model, as majority of financial variables are not normally 
distributed and therefore the use of some other models could bias the results. On the other 
hand, some writers see this as the con of the logistic model; the fact that logistic regression 
25 Model 7 is further discussed in Section 4.3.
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does not assume a liner relation between the independent and the dependent variables has been 
criticized. Nevertheless, there is evidence that a majority of credit scoring datasets work well 
with the logistic model as they show only weak linearity (Chen and Huang, 2003).
Wood and Piesse (1987) suggest that a model’s ability to discriminate ex ante between failure 
and survival is showing its true usefulness instead of differentiating between the two ex post. 
Unlike in some prior studies such as Gilbert et al. (1990), my data are not an ex post selected set 
of failed and healthy firms. Instead, I observe firms ex ante and follow their possible succession 
in paying their bills on time during January 2010 – May 2011, and their tendency towards 
payment failure during June 2011 – May 2012. Similar technique has been used by Turetsky 
and McEwen (2001). Naturally not setting the number of failed firms fixed before deriving 
the data leads to a higher rate in healthy companies which gives a more realistic image of the 
general population. This is also prominent in my data; 2.96% of the firms followed through 
2010-2012 are considered as failed while rest of the client firms are considered as profitable 
clients (non-failed) for Company X – at least during the timeframe of this study.
3.2 Limitations of the Study
The unique data has both pros and cons. On the one hand, it offers a close view on one large 
Finnish company’s B2B clientele’s behavior; on the other hand, it represents only a small fraction 
of the Finnish B2B construction market and thus the results’ application to other business areas 
needs more research before any strict conclusions can be made.
Right censoring
The unique approach to the definition of the dependent variable by Company X, payment 
failure, restricts the use of the results without further research. The most important limitation 
is the definition of the dependent variable, and its measurement. There are several clients in 
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the data set that do not fall in the category of a failed firm but still pay very poorly. On the 
other hand, even a failed firm might have a significant change in its financial situation after 
the timeframe of the study. The definition of payment failure is also applicable to Company 
X only; another company may find an unprofitable, failed, client of this study yet a profitable 
one, or vice versa, find a client unprofitable even after one long payment delay. The definition 
of an unprofitable client is very industry dependent as well. In some other industry where 
purchases are made very often, only three late payments are easily covered by tens or hundreds 
of prompt payments by the same client.
Due to the rather different roles that different construction goods have in a project’s lifecycle, 
it is a known fact among the players that their customers are more prone to paying on time at 
the beginning of a construction project’s lifecycle, and more likely to have difficulties at the 
end of the lifecycle, as the start-up capital tends to have run out and profits are still awaited. 
Companies are often specialized on different parts of a construction project lifecycle with 
their products. Companies that sell, rent or produce goods that are used at the beginning of 
a project, are more likely to be paid on time both for reasons linked to the finances of the 
customer and the fact that customers often wish to keep their relationships strong especially 
to companies that offer services that are crucial for the smooth beginning of a project. A pool 
of companies with a similar and overlapping customer base could significantly benefit from 
sharing of private information concerning early signs of payment difficulties by their shared 
clients. However, the fact that Company X profits from its role in the beginning of the product 
lifecycle in the construction field, may lead to the share of failed client firms to be relatively 
smaller for Company X compared to other players in the sector. Thus, the results of this study 
should be carefully applied especially when dealing with business sectors very different from 
the construction business. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that a client firm with more than 
three severe payment delays within a year is likely to cause some troubles for its creditors and 
other companies that it is in a business relationship with, also outside the construction field.
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Selection and survival bias
Selection bias might be present in this thesis, although it is not expected to have great effect on 
the results. The data comprises of only client companies that are already in a business relationship 
with Company X and have made payments during the past 12 months. Thus firms that have not 
appeared sufficiently creditworthy, or have for example severe prior payment defaults, are most 
likely denied credit and thus left outside of the sample already at the beginning. Selection bias 
in the loan approval process, or client credit approval in the context of this study, could bias 
the weights in the scoring model estimate (Mester, 1997).  According to Banasik, Crook and 
Thomas (2003) such models can be presumed unimpaired only if the “accepted” sample firms’ 
behavior is identical to those “rejected”. Nevertheless, regardless of whether a model may be 
presumed to govern all firms, the model can be used to more accurately predict the subsequent 
payment performance (Basanik et al, 2003). Additionally, Basanik et al. (2003) find that the 
difference between the accepted and rejected groups is only small.
Moreover, the purpose of this study is to analyze an existing client firm’s probability to fail in 
its payments, thus, Company X is interested in the possible qualities of a failed firm that the 
company might have overlooked so far when making its credit decisions. The goal of the thesis 
is not to predict the likelihood of payment failure for a randomly chosen firm, but to predict the 
probability of failure for Company X’s existing clientele. As my models attempt to capture the 
future payment performance of existing clients, selection bias is an irrelevant problem in this 
study. As for new clients, the model as it is cannot be used. The model can be run only after 
some payment behavior data has accumulated in the company’s ledger. In spite of this, financial 
and background variables are robust also in case of new clients: ledger variable models are 
expected to work best when used as the extension of Asiakastieto Ltd’s current model that 
offers longer inspection interval compared to day-to-day ledger data.
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Survival bias could be present as some of the firms might turn into unprofitable clients, or 
some of the bills might be paid, after the timeframe of this study. To prevent survival bias, 
all bills are treated equally regardless of whether they have been paid by the end of the 
timeframe; only the number of days a bill was paid after its due date, or the number of days a 
bill is still late at the end of May 2012, are considered. Company X did not define any certain 
limit of days after which a bill would be considered permanently defaulted. From the data it is 
visible that some payments have been received even more than a year late, which is probably 
not uncommon for this type of industry where projects can be delayed and profits can be 
realized only after months or years. Moreover, the purpose of this paper is to study somewhat 
short-term changes and patterns in behavior, visible in daily ledger transactions during some 
two years. Thus I leave the analysis of long-term behavioral patterns for future research.
Moreover, for example, a late payment of a 500-euro bill is not directly comparable to a late 
payment of a 15,000-euro bill. However, the assumption of this study is that the collection and 
monitoring costs due to payment failure, make a firm an unprofitable client after the limit of at 
least three at least 30 days late payments by the client firm, regardless of the sums in question. It 
is also very likely that a firm that pays its bills late this often will continue to do so in the future. 
As discussed earlier, the definition of failure is subject to Company X’s business characteristics 
and the company’s own analysis of its client firms’ profitability. In summary of the limitations 
of this study, the results discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 should be carefully examined when 
applying outside the construction industry. 
Naturally the sample restricts the wide use of the results before more research is available of the 
use of ledger data in corporate failure prediction, using a sample of randomly chosen firms from 
all industries. However, although the definition of the dependent variable is company-related, 
the thesis is expected to provide useful evidence on the use of ledger data in payment behavior 
prediction. If ledger information prove to have significant prediction power in the models 
developed in this study, the use of ledger variables is justifiable in other industries as well.
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3.3 Descriptions of Independent Variables and Hypotheses
I use four different types of independent variables to predict payment failure: (1) financial 
variables; (2) non-financial background variables including general information of each firm, 
industry variables and past registered financial difficulties or payment disturbances; (3) payment 
behavior and other variables computed from ledger data; and (4) Asiakastieto Ltd’s letter rating 
scores, named Rating Alfa.
3.3.1 Financial Variables
According to Laitinen and Laitinen (2009), independent variables should be chosen for their 
relation to the symptoms of financial distress. Because the dependent variable in this study 
is different from prior research, I expect ledger information describing past history to best 
predict the payment failures one year later. In addition, however, I study whether payment 
failure is related to weak financials to analyze the possible reasons behind poor payment 
habits. Laitinen and Laitinen (2009) use six independent financial variables in payment 
default prediction; size is measured by logarithm of net sales, growth by percentage change in 
net sales, profitability by return on investment ratio, liquidity by the quick ratio, cash flow by 
the relation of operating cash flow to net sales, and leverage by the equity ratio based on book 
value of assets. Previous literature supports the use of these financial dimensions (see, Scott, 
1981; Jones, 1987; Laitinen, 1991, and the discussion in Chapter 2). Laitinen and Laitinen 
(2009) show that size, liquidity and low leverage are negatively related to default while the 
relation is positive for growth of net sales. 
The sample consisting of firms with financial statement information available, the reduced 
sample, is used to test the prediction ability of financial data gathered by Asiakastieto Ltd 
at the end of 2010. After some preliminary tests, I restrict the number of variables to those 
that significantly add information to the model. I use current ratio to describe liquidity, equity 
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ratio to take account of leverage and a dummy variable named ’Operating_profit_dummy’ to 
describe whether a firm has generated a positive (0) or a negative (1) operating profit. This 
variable considers the profitability dimension. All variable descriptions and their formulas are 
presented in Appendix 1, Table II.
Richardson, Kane and Lobingier (1998) study the effect of economic recession on corporate 
failure prediction. The writers find that the prediction power of financial variables might be 
affected by economic downturn; however especially current ratio and leverage measures 
perform well during a downturn period. As this study uses data from 2010 – 2012, the ongoing 
sovereign debt crisis and its effects on Finnish economy might affect the power of the models. 
Naturally the sample might be skewed due to the sensitiveness of construction business to 
economic turbulence. To avoid this, the financial variables used in this study reflect leverage 
(equity ratio) and liquidity (current ratio). Moreover, in Finland, equity ratio has been proved 
to be a “superior single predictor of payment default” (Laitinen and Laitinen, 2009; see, also, 
Laitinen, 1999; 2005).
3.3.2 Non-Financial Variables
Non-financial variables are somewhat a new subject of research in the failure prediction literature. 
Keasey and Watson (1987) show that the number of directors and submission lags are accurate 
in financial distress prediction. Laitinen (1999) use both publicly registered and unofficially 
registered payment delays in his study and shows that payment history and characteristics of 
directors are important predictors of the risk assessment scores made by financial analysts. Back 
(2005) studies characteristics of management, prior payment behavior, group membership and 
age in failure prediction and finds support on Laitinen’s (1999) results. Additionally to payment 
history, both the age of a firm and industry variables are shown to possess predictive power also 
in other studies such as El Hennawy and Morris (1983) and Shumway (2001).
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Laitinen and Laitinen (2009) use measures such as firm age, industry, submission lag, 
characteristics of directors, and company legal form to predict registered payment default. The 
paper finds empirical evidence that number of board members decrease the likelihood of a 
default while industry propensity to default (%), number of board members’ links to default 
firms or their own personal defaults, significantly increase the probability of failure. The paper 
also documents that default firms are significantly younger compared to non-default firms. 
Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2008) study credit rating disagreements due to asymmetric information 
and argue that young SMEs are informationally opaque. Asymmetric information could explain 
the higher likelihood of younger firms defaulting in their payments as lenders have less credible 
information as a basis for credit decisions; private internal information accumulated during the 
client relationship becomes even more important.
General information. Independent variables belonging to this group are a customer firm’s age 
in years since foundation and the size of its balance sheet. As in prior research, I use the natural 
logarithm of total assets as a proxy for size. Age is measured in years since the registration of 
the firm. Prior studies suggest that size of a distressed firm is positively related to its survival 
as larger firms tend to better manage adversity (Thompson, 1976; Altman et al., 1977; Ohlson, 
1980; Chen and Lee, 1993; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). Age of a firm is usually treated 
as a proxy for reputation, connections and stability of business. Laitinen (1999), and Laitinen 
and Laitinen (2009) show that older firms are less likely to default in their payments. Chen and 
Lee (1993) find that firm age and size correlate strongly implying that age could be used as a 
proxy for size. Size and credit risk are usually shown to be inversely related (Laitinen, 1999); 
smaller firms are riskier as they are often younger and their balance sheets and cash flows might 
not be strong enough to overcome financial distress. As this thesis measures the likelihood of 
payment failure, instead of an official default, it will be interesting to see whether larger firms 
in my sample fail less frequently – or whether some of the firms seem to fail for reasons other 
than poor financials or approaching financial distress.
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Industry variables. Industry variable ‘Industry_risk’ is used to control for the firms’ 
business fields’ and markets’ economic situation and it measures the share of firms with 
reported payment disturbances during the past 12 months. Thus, Industry_risk describes 
the firms’ industry categories’ propensity to default (%), reported by Asiakastieto Ltd at 
the end of year 2010. Financial statement data and background information were gathered 
from Asiakastieto Ltd’s database and they describe each firm’s characteristics at the end 
of year 2010. The industrial classification of the firms is presented in Appendix I, Table I. 
Six industry specifications were used as an independent categorical variable, as shown in 
Table II: (TOL1) manufacturing, (TOL2) transportation and storage, (TOL3) professional, 
scientific and technical activities, (TOL4) administrative and support service activities, 
(TOL5) wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, and (TOL6) 
construction. The rest of the business fields are described as (TOL7) others. ‘Others’ was 
used as the comparison group in the categorical variable named “TOL”, that describes 
the industrial categories of firms, so that, for example TOL1 (TOL6) describes the higher 
likelihood of payment failure that firms operating in manufacturing business (construction 
business) have, compared to firms operating in other industries present in the sample. 
Registered financial difficulties or payment disturbances. Laitinen (1999) uses payment history 
variables such as the number of publicly registered bad debts to predict analysts’ credit risk 
estimates with good results. In my study, variable ‘Past_default_dummy’ takes the value of one 
(1) if any of the following is different from zero; number of past registered defaults, number of 
past registered bankruptcy applications, number of past restructuring applications or number of 
past reminders of last resort before collection, and zero (0) otherwise.
3.3.3 Ledger Data Variables
In addition to past payment variables, Company X’s ledger data are used to identify client 
firms better; length of client relationship with Company X, and Company X’s category of the 
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customers’ importance to the company, are used as background information. Length of the client 
relationship is measured in years since first purchase. Clients with ‘abnormally’ high client 
importance status are removed from the data not to bias the results. These clients with ‘VIP’ 
treatment are often large publicly listed companies that are not deemed unprofitable or failed 
regardless of their payment behavior. Nevertheless, large firms subject to normal collection 
process are a part of this study and thus the impact of size is of empirical interest.
Payment history is the only independent variable that is able to capture the firms’ situation 
very close to the time period when the dependent variable is measured. Laitinen (1999) finds 
the logarithmic number of recent serious and systematic delays in payments (unofficially 
registered by main creditors) to significantly increase the credit risk estimate of a firm. Wilson 
et. al. (2000) successfully model future payment behavior with using a payment index as their 
independent variable. In addition, prior research has used payment history also in failure 
prediction; Lawrence and Smith (1992) study loan defaults and delinquencies in mobile 
home industry and find payment history, measured by most recent delinquency status and 
frequencies of 30-day and 60-day delinquencies during the previous year, to be paramount in 
loan default prediction.
H1: Variables calculated from the ledger data moderates other information needed in future 
payment behavior prediction.
Back (2005) finds that non-financial variables show potential tendencies towards financial 
difficulties earlier than financial variables. Payment transaction data offers the most up-to-
date information about each client firm’s probability to fail in its payments. Payment behavior 
variables have also other pros; payment failure might either be an indicator of financial difficulties 
or a behavioral pattern that a firm has in its transactions. Financial difficulties may be temporary 
but often lead to a series of events. Payment disturbances can also affect a firm’s reputation 
and worsen the wicked cycle. Payment delays can weaken a firm’s creditors’ confidence in the 
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company, cease its future credits or increase its interest rates, and thus decrease its investments 
leading to even more difficulties. (See, also, Back, 2005). On the other hand, payment failure 
might be a sign of a firm’s misuse of its purchase power and thus client status; payment delays 
might also signal the use of trade credit as extended credit (Wilson & Summers, 2000). If 
the reasons behind payment failure are not linked to financial troubles, it is possible that one 
explanation can be found looking at working capital management. Whether payment failure is 
related to financial difficulties or payment habits, real-time ledger data offers the most recent 
information about a client firm’s payment delays.
This paper’s use of variables describing past payment behavior is similar to Back (2005), who 
shows that previous payment delays significantly increase the probability of bankruptcy and 
reorganization. Back (2005) argues that payment delays might be the beginning of a permanent 
payment default. This conclusion supports the importance of identifying client firms with payment 
disturbances early enough. A company might find justifiable to end its business relationship to a 
client firm with regular late payments before the relationship’s profitability turns negative.
The main variables computed from Company X’s ledger data, describing past payment behavior, 
are the natural logarithm of number of delayed payments measured during January 2010 – May 
2011. The variables have been divided into two groups depending on the number of days a payment 
has been paid, or is still in May 2012, late; 8-29 days and 30 or more days. The company sends 
a reminder bill only after a delay of eight days due to banks’ transaction lags and possible effects 
of weekends and public holidays. The first variable named ‘late8-29’ is the natural logarithm of 
number of bills paid 8-29 days after the due date, divided by the natural logarithm of total assets 
in 2010. The second variable, ‘late30+’, is the natural logarithm of number of bills paid at least 30 
days after the due date, divided by the natural logarithm of total assets in 2010. 
A large firm probably generates more accounts payable, in absolute terms, compared to a small 
firm, independent of its financial situation. Moreover, larger firms tend to purchase more often 
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and, other things equal, also pay late a larger absolute number of their bills even if the relative 
amount of late payments would be equal to that of smaller firms. Large firms may also misuse 
their purchase power and importance as a client and delay their payments for convenience 
reasons. To take account of this, I compute all ledger variables in relation to each firm’s size; 
dividing the number of late payments by total assets eliminates the possible size bias by making 
the variables relative to a firm’s purchase power.26 
In addition, two other ledger variables are computed to test the robust use of ledger information; 
‘RelativeLate’ is the total number of payments made at least eight days after the due date during 
January 2010 – May 2011, divided by the total number of purchases made during the same 
period, by the same firm. ‘RelativeLate30+’ describes the number of bills paid at least 30 days 
after the due date, divided by the number of all bills paid at least eight days after the due date.
Additionally to payment history, Company X’s information includes the length of each 
client firm’s business relationship with the company. Wilner (2000) argues that longer client 
firm–creditor firm relationships induce dependent creditors to grant more debt concessions 
when the debt is renegotiated, compared to non-dependent creditors. The more concession a 
borrower receives, the lower should be the probability of payments difficulties. A longer client 
relationship also accumulates knowledge and reduces informational asymmetries which make 
credit decisions easier for the creditor company (See also the discussion in Subsection 2.3.2).
H2: The longer the client relationship, the less likely the client firm is to fail in its payments.
26 In addition to total assets, the effect of size has been tested using other proxies of size in the denominator 
for past payment behavior variables: net sales in 2010 and total purchases made during January 2010 
– May 2011 were also used in preliminary testing. The results are robust and support the results gained 
with variables described in this study.
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3.4 Combined Information
Financial and non-financial as well as payment behavior variables correlate to some extent and may 
include overlapping information, thus diminishing each other’s effects. To prevent multicollinearity, 
variables have been selected to avoid introducing highly correlated variables to the model 
concurrently.27 Correlation matrixes are presented in Appendix III. Nevertheless, a model using 
combined information is usually expected to outperform models based on financial or non-financial 
variables alone in terms of binary classification and fit (see, Keasey & Watson, 1987).
H3: The models based on combinations of internal and external data outperform models using 
only internal or only external data.
However, in this study, the financial variables measured at the end of year 2010 are expected to 
have significantly lower prediction power on payment failure taking place during June 2011 – 
May 2012 compared to payment history variables measured during January 2010 – May 2011. 
This expectation is based on both the longer time lag between the measurement of the financial 
variables and the dependent variable, and the fact that payments delays will not in all cases yield 
from financial distress or lead to financial default, in which case financial variables are expected 
to be ineffective. The effect of combining payment behavior information with financial and non-
financial background information is left as an empirical question rather than a hypothesis. The 
hypotheses concerning models using combined information should be subject to the combination 
of variables used in the empirical study, as noted by Laitinen and Laitinen (2009).
H4: Variables calculated from the ledger data offer additional information over and above 
traditionally used financial and non-financial information in payment failure prediction.
27 Farrar and Glauber (1967) conclude that multicollinearity is not likely to affect results as long as 
correlation between variables is below 0.8.  Moreover, the highest correlation in the models occurs 
between categorical variables’ different categories. No other highly correlating variables are introduced 
to a model concurrently. 
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In addition to financial and non-financial separately chosen variables, I test whether Asiakastieto 
Ltd’s letter rating scores assigned at the end of 2010, named Rating Alfa, add information to 
a model using primarily only ledger data. Rating scores are a complex mixture of financial, 
non-financial and payment history variables gathered from external sources such as financial 
statements, public registries and also a pool of other companies ledger data, not linked 
to Company X. Rating Alfa estimates a firm’s probability of facing financial difficulties or 
bankruptcy within the next 3 years following assignment. As the ratings do not measure the 
exact same event as the definition of payment failure in this paper describes, it is expected 
that Company X’s own ledger data offer more up-to-date and accurate information over and 
above current rating scores. However, it is hypothesized in H3 that the combination of these 
two information sources together work better at predicting future payment behavior than ledger 
data do alone.
H5: A company’s own ledger data variables are the most significant predictors of payment 
failure, even compared to rating scores that use a pool of other companies’ ledger data with 
financial and background variables.
4 Results
Firstly, the following chapter presents the descriptive statistics, and secondly results from the 
binary logistic models are analyzed. In the Models 1 through 4 I first use the weighted reduced 
sample of firms with financial statement information available to study the prediction power of 
traditionally used financial and somewhat newly introduced non-financial background variables. 
Second, I compare the results from Model 1 to Model 2a that utilizes primarily only ledger 
data, and examine whether ledger variables have higher prediction power compared to external 
information used in Model 1. Thirdly, I study whether Models 3 and 4 using combinations of 
external and internal data outperform models that use only internal or only external information. 
Finally, I use the whole sample, that includes both firms for which financial statements are not 
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available and firms of the reduced sample, of Model 5 to test the accuracy of ledger data in 
payment failure prediction. In Model 6 utilizing the whole sample, I use Rating Alfa as an 
independent variable in addition to ledger data variables. 
The seven letter ratings describe the risk estimate of each firm so that AAA denotes the highest 
rating and C denotes the poorest rating, respectively. Rating score C has been used as the 
comparison group in the models so that each coefficient of a letter rating AAA–B in the model 
denotes the lower risk of a firm with that rating, compared to the firms with the rating ‘C’. As 
rating scores are created to measure the long-term credit worthiness of a firm, it is expected that 
the scores of 2010 should also be able to predict payment failures during June 2011 – May 2012 
somewhat precisely. All variable descriptions and their formulas are presented in Appendix 1, 
Table II.
Comparison of means
T-tests of differences in means between failed and non-failed firms are presented in Table III. 
Test statistics show that the firms differ from each other significantly with respect to age, size, 
current ratio, equity ratio, operating profit, past default history and payment habits. Also the 
firms’ industry categories’ propensity to default (%) seems to be on average higher for failed 
firms, the difference being statistically significant at the 1% level. The average age for a failed 
firm is 15.96 years while it is 18.59 years for firms that are more likely to pay their bills on time. 
The average sizes of the balance sheet for a failed and a non-failed firm are 68.27 and 18.33 
million euro, respectively.28 The result supports the earlier discussion that larger firms may take 
advantage of their purchase power and pay late for convenience reasons. On the other hand, 
Deloof (2003) studies large Belgian firms and concludes that less profitable firms wait longer 
28 As discussed in Subsection 3.3.3 in more detail, to account for the significant influence of size, and 
to consider the potential bias of larger firms making more purchases and thus paying a larger number 
of bills late, ledger data variables describing past payment behavior have been divided with size thus 
neutralizing the possible bias effect.
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to pay their bills. Thus, it is left for future research to analyze, whether large companies with 
financial troubles affect the results more than their non-failed peers, or whether large firms for 
example use trade credit as extended credit and fail because of convenience reasons.
Non-failed firms have been in a business relationship with Company X on average for 6.33 years 
while failed firms have been clients on average for 6.12 years. The difference is not significant, 
however, probably due to the somewhat small number of failed firms in the unweighted sample. 
Also higher liquidity, measured by current ratio, and stronger balance sheet, described with equity 
ratio, seems to be associated with good paying habits more often: current ratio is on average 
2.68 (1.40) and equity ratio 35.74% (18.59%) for non-failed firms (failed firms). The medians 
give further support to the results; for example, while median values of variables describing past 
payment delays are zeros for non-failed firms, the values are positive for failed firms. All figures 
are presented in Appendix 1, Table III, in more detail.
4.1 Models Using the Reduced Sample
Models based on financial and non-financial information
Model 1, Panel 1 through 3, in Appendix 2, present the results for the binary logistic regression 
model predicting payment failure on the basis of eight financial and background variables 
that proved most significant in the preliminary tests. Panel 1 shows the model summary tests. 
The Nagelkerke R-Square (a modified version of the Cox & Snell R-square) for the model is 
0.245. The most significant parameter is the ln(size), measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets, with a Wald statistic of 983.9. However, also the natural logarithm of age, current 
ratio, categorical industry variable TOL, and the industry categories’ propensity to default (%), 
‘Industry_risk’, have somewhat high Wald statistics even though size clearly dominates the 
information in the model. All eight variables are significant at the 1% confidence level. The 
model classifies correctly 67.1% of non-failed firms and 72.2% of failed firms.
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In summary, the probability of payment failure is significantly increased with size, negative 
operating profit, level of risk in the firm’s industry, and existence of past registered financial 
troubles. On the other hand, age, current ratio and equity ratio seem to reduce the likelihood of 
payment failure. Client firms operating in (TOL6) construction, (TOL3) professional, scientific 
and technical activities, (TOL4) administrative and support service activities, (TOL5) wholesale 
and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, (TOL2) transportation and storage, 
and (TOL1) manufacturing are associated with failure more often compared to other industries, 
so that TOL6, construction, shows the highest risk towards payment failure, whereas TOL1, 
manufacturing, shows the lowest risk, respectively. Appendix I, Table I, presents the industrial 
classification of firms and their respective shares of failed and non-failed firms.
The results concerning the influence of age, leverage, liquidity and past signs of financial distress on 
the likelihood of payment failure, support earlier evidence reported by Laitinen and Laitinen (2009) 
among others. Again, the effect of size and age are supported by theory presented in Subsection 2.3.2; 
older firms on are more likely to have more established business, larger funds and a reputation to 
protect which all make these firms better payers; larger firms are more likely to have an opportunity 
to misuse their purchase power and may pay late due to reasons other than financial troubles. On the 
other hand, the business relationship with Company X might be crucial for some of the smaller firms 
in which case reputation as a prompt payer is important for business continuation.
Since the definition of payment failure is company-related to some extent, the background of 
Company X’s clientele must be considered. The following analysis is not based on discussions with 
Company X. Firstly, it could be that a firm that makes large purchases on a regular basis brings 
more revenue to the company compared to a smaller firm; following its purchase power, a large 
firm might be approved trade credit more easily than a small firm. This could lead to a large firm 
receiving credit even with weaker financials compared to a small firm only because a large firm is 
nonetheless seen as a less risky choice due to reasons such as a larger balance sheet, monitoring 
backed by several creditors, better reputation and, naturally, ability to generate more cash flow to 
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the creditor-company. If larger firms are given credit on easier terms and “second chances” more 
often, even after some payment disturbances, large firms might be attempted to delay payments. 
Smaller firms, which are followed much more closely both preceding and following a positive credit 
decision, have a higher incentive to protect their reputation, especially as small firms are often new 
entrants in the market. The evidence supports this conclusion; size of a firm has a positive effect on 
the likelihood of payment failure. This result contradicts the evidence in majority of prior studies 
(see, among others, Scott, 1981; Jones, 1987; Laitinen & Laitinen, 2009). However, the evidence 
does not necessarily mean that larger firms are riskier per se but that they might have been granted 
credit more easily in the first place. 
Secondly, larger firms may misuse their client relationship status; a large client is important for a 
company and thus its poor payment behavior might be overlooked. Larger firms also gain from 
‘economies of scale’ as they are more likely to have investment activity that yields returns higher 
than the interest rate paid for late payments – the opportunity cost of paying on time might just be 
too high. This result implicates that the use of trade credit as extended credit could explain at least 
a fraction of the payment delays (see Wilson & Summers, 2000). The above is also the reason for 
restricting the sample only to firms with normal collection procedure; as stated earlier, clients with a 
‘VIP’ treatment are not part of this study.
Models based on ledger data
Model 2a presents the results for the logistic regression model based on the ledger data received 
from Company X. Panel 1 shows that the -2 Log likelihood test and pseudo R-squares for the model 
using ledger data are better than those for Model 1 using financial and non-financial variables. The 
Nagelkerke R-square is 0.505 and the overall classification 79.3%. Panel 2a also shows that the Wald 
statistic values are on average significantly higher for variables describing past payment behavior 
compared to the Wald statistics of the variables based on financial and background information. 
The payment behavior variables ‘late8-29’ and ‘late30+’ have Wald statistics of 1468.5 and 516.0, 
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respectively. Past payment history clearly is a dominating factor when predicting payment failure.
Laitinen (1999) shows that the logarithmic number of recent serious and systematic delays in 
payments significantly increases a corporate analyst’s risk estimate of the firm in question. My 
evidence supports his findings: the risk of a client firm failing in its payments is significantly 
increased with payment delays, independent of the number of days a bill has been late.29 Moreover, 
my results show that the natural logarithm of number of bills paid either 8-29 or at least 30 days 
after the due date, divided by the natural logarithm of total assets, are accurate predictors of 
payment failure independent of the denominator; all variables using total assets, net sales and 
number of total purchases as a denominator are significant. Different denominators are used to test 
the variables’ robustness: ledger data has economically significant prediction power even when 
different measures of the client firms’ size, and thus purchasing power, are used.30 
I also test the use of two different ledger variables in Model 2b; variable ‘RelativeLate’ describes 
the number of bills paid at least eight days after the due date, divided by total number of 
purchases by the same firm. Variable ‘RelativeLate30+’ describes the number of bills paid at 
least 30 days late, divided by the number of all bills paid at least eight days late. Also these 
variables are significant predictors of payment failure, adding robustness to the use of ledger 
data in failure prediction. However, Model 2a overperforms Model 2b in terms of goodness of 
fit, measured by R squared, and firms’ accurate classification; consequently, the ledger variables 
presented in Model 2a are used in the final models. Nevertheless, the results are consistent 
with the first hypothesis, H1, presented in Subsection 3.3.3: ledger data variables are accurate 
predictors of payment failure, even when used in a model without financial variables. 
The length of the client relationship with Company X is inversely related to the probability 
29 Company X sends the first reminder note only eight days after the due date. The eight days are used to 
account for public holidays, weekends and different lengths of payment transactions by banks.
30 All different variables tested are not presented in this thesis. However, all the results are available upon 
request.
48The Use of Corporate Ledger Information in Payment Behavior Prediction – Evidence from the Finnish Construction Industry
of payment failure. The result is consistent with the theory on information asymmetry and 
relationship lending presented in Chapter 2 and H2 presented in Subsection 3.3.3; a more 
established relationship gives the creditor superior knowledge of that client firm, which helps 
the credit decision-making process. In addition, lenders are prone to ease the terms of credit 
with better-known and trusted clients. (Berger & Udell, 1995; Wilner, 2000; Sharpe, 1990). 
Moreover, client firm age has a negative relation with the likelihood of failure, as in the 
previous models, giving support to prior research linking longer age to better reputation and 
more established business (See discussion in Chapter 2).
Models based on combined information
Model 3 presents a model combining ledger data variables to selected financial and non-financial 
background variables. This model seems to predict payment failure the most accurately: the 
model classifies 83.6% of non-failed and 77.8% of failed firms correctly. The Nagelkerke 
R-Square is the highest so far with the value of 0.544. Also the –2 Log likelihood and the 
pseudo R-squares continue to improve from the previous models. Perhaps the only problem 
with Model 3 is the dominance of the ledger variables; ledger data contributes to the model 
significantly and moderates the information from financial and non-financial variables, which 
can be seen from the smaller Wald statistics of financial and non-financial variables compared 
to Model 1. Nevertheless, a model based on ledger data, and selected financial and non-financial 
variables, outperforms Models 1 and 2 that use only external or internal information alone. The 
results are consistent with hypotheses H1 through H4. Ledger data variables have economically 
significant prediction power, even over traditionally used financial and background variables; 
coefficients and Wald statistics both show highest values for variables describing past payment 
behavior. Moreover, Model 3 that combines external financial and background information to 
ledger data variables has a higher R square value and better classification accuracy compared to 
Models 1 and 2. However, the difference between the accuracy of Model 2a and Model 3 might 
not be significant enough to reject the null hypothesis that the models do not significantly differ 
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from each other and to accept Hypothesis 3; naturally the goodness of fit increases when more 
variables are introduced to a model.
All variables introduced in the previous models keep their information content fairly intact. 
The only notable difference is that equity ratio loses some of its significance and its coefficient 
turns slightly positive. However, equity ratio has small information content also in Model 1 that 
is based on financial and non-financial variables alone. One explanation might be that equity 
ratio does not best describe leverage in this industry or that it does not directly correlate with 
payment behavior; firms with refined ratings tend to save less cash and have significantly more 
long term debt (Almeida, Campello & Weisbach, 2004; Tang, 2006). As ratings are based on 
payment defaults among other financial and non-financial aspects, a firm with an improved 
rating based on other variables than equity ratio, might have high amount of long-term debt 
compared to other firms and consequently a low equity ratio. Additionally, Laitinen and Laitinen 
(2009) argue that equity ratio reported in financial statements is upwards biased for firms in 
financial distress. Thus the use of equity ratio is controversial; it is widely used yet it is subject 
to manipulation and can be easily misconstrued.
Wilson et al. (2000) use payment information from an index called D&B Payment Score and show 
that accounting information predicts payment behavior much poorer than it does for corporate 
default. This is a natural consequence of the difference in publication between accounting 
and payment information; at best financial statements are reported quarterly whereas client’s 
cash flow transactions update to the ledger on a daily basis. My results support the findings of 
Wilson et al. (2000); financial and background variables alone have poorer prediction power on 
payment failure compared to payment history variables.
Clearly, however, the use of financial statements and other background information improves 
a model’s accuracy in payment behavior prediction. According to Carey and Hrycay (2001), 
rating agencies assign their ratings based on stress tests and a borrower’s projected condition in 
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the downside scenario (a ‘through-the-cycle method’) while banks and other companies grant 
credit according to clients’ current condition (point-in-time method).31 Similar difference is 
present in my results;  Asiakastieto Ltd’s rating scores “analyze a firm’s financial and background 
information, as well as estimate its probability of facing financial difficulties or bankruptcy 
within the next 3 years” (Asiakastieto Ltd), while financial ratios offer a point-in-time analysis 
of certain key figures.
A model where Asiakastieto Ltd’s rating scores are added to the Model 2a using primarily 
only ledger variables is shown in Model 4. The –2 Log likelihood and the pseudo R-squares 
show better values for the model based on combined information compared to Model 2a using 
ledger variables. Also the Nagelkerke R-Square is somewhat higher at 0.512 (0.505) for Model 
4 (Model 2a). Model 4 also classifies slightly better: 83.2% (83.5%) of non-failed and 76.7% 
(75.0%) of failed firms are correctly classified.
Asiakastieto Ltd’s letter ratings assigned at the end of 2010 are significantly related to the 
likelihood of payment failure during June 2011 – May 2012. The results implicate that a firm 
with strong financial and background variables, followed by an assignment of a higher Rating 
Alfa letter score, is less likely to fail in its payments. A high Rating Alfa score thus signals 
punctual payment behavior and work as a certification of quality, whether the score measures 
financial health or payment morale (see, also, Hsueh & Kidwell, 1988; Millon and Thakor, 
1985, on the certification role of rating services). It would indeed seem that payment failure 
is a sign of impending failure as shown by Wilson et al. (2000). However this result does not 
indicate that some firms would not pay poorly for reasons other than financial difficulties; as in 
this thesis, larger firms seem to be associated with poor payment habits more often than smaller 
firms, hinting of a possible misuse of economies of scale – or efficiency of working capital 
management – depending on the point of view.
31 Treacy and Carey (1998) argue that credit agencies’ method is too expensive for banks, which implies 
a continuing need for the use of point-in-time method.
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On the other hand, Model 3 using selected financial and non-financial variables outperforms 
Model 4 using ready rating scores. It might be that some variables contributing to the current 
ratings reflect the risk of the firms used in this study, while some variables do not. If Asiakastieto 
Ltd wishes to expand its services towards more customer-oriented unique rating services, its 
rating scoring model could be modified according to the customer company in question, and 
more importantly, according to the definition of failure and its severity depending on each 
company’s needs and characteristics.
4.2 Models Using the Whole Sample
The weighted whole sample of 7741 failed and 7741 non-failed firms is used to account also 
for firms for which ledger data are available but financial statements are not. This whole sample 
better represents the clientele of Company X and thus the final comparisons of models are 
presented using this sample.
Model 5 Panel 1 shows the model summary tests of the model using primarily only ledger information, 
and Model 6 Panel 1 presents the model summary tests using the sample data with rating score 
variables in addition to ledger variables. The models are compared in terms of classification accuracy, 
Nagelkerke R-Squares, the –2 Log Likelihood test, the pseudo R-squares, Type I and Type II errors 
and the ROC curve as well as the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. As expected, the model with 
additional external information, in the form of rating scores, better predicts a firm’s probability to fail in 
its payments and become an unprofitable client. Model 6 using both ledger data and ready rating scores 
has Nagelkerke R-Square of 0.425, exceeding that of Model 5 using only ledger data variables (0.382). 
Also the –2 Log Likelihood is lower and the pseudo R-squares higher for the model combining ledger 
data to existing credit scores, supporting the use of combined information. In addition, the model using 
combined data (ledger data) correctly classifies 81.1% (81.3%) of the non-failed and 70.7% (65.9%) 
of the failed firms. Even though the ledger data variables still have very high Wald statistics, the rating 
scores clearly add information to the model, consistently with Hypothesis 3. 
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Figure 2 shows the ROC curves of Model 5 (represented by the blue line) and Model 6 (represented 
by the green line). By convention, models predicting credit default are evaluated by using power 
curves, which make the predictive power of a model quantifiable  (see, among others, Birdsall, 
1973; Hanley and McNeil, 1982; Hanley, 1989; Pepe, 2002; Sobehart,  Keenan & Stein, 2000; 
Swets, 1988, 1996). According to Stein (2005), “A receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve 
plots the Type II error against one minus the Type I error” and describes the percentage of non-
failing firms that must be unintentionally denied credit (Type II error) to avoid offering credit to 
a specific percentage of failing firms (1-Type I error) when a certain failure model is used. ROC 
analysis produces a cost-benefit analysis of some sort, since extending credit to a failing firm is 
usually associated with higher costs compared to not extending credit, or granting credit with 
overly strict terms, to a non-failing firm. As the true costs of a payment failure are not known in 
this study, ROC analysis cannot be used to determine the optimal cut-off that minimizes costs for 
Company X. However, ROC curves can be used to analyze which model, Model 5 or Model 6, 
offers highest prediction power. Figure 2 shows that Model 6 that combines internal ledger and 
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external rating score information, represented by the green line, has better accuracy in payment 
failure prediction, as hypothesized in H3. 
Moreover, I use the Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test) to estimate the two 
models’ goodness of fit; this test has the advantage that it does not make any assumptions 
about the distribution of data. Model 6 classifies firms somewhat better also according to this 
test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z value is somewhat higher 7.854 for Model 6 compared to Model 
5 (7.418), both statistics being significant at the 1% level. Type I error of incorrectly granting 
credit to a failing firm is 34.1% for Model 5 and 29.3% for Model 6 whilst Type II error of 
incorrectly denying a non-failing firm credit is 18.7% for Model 5 and 18.9% for Model 6. 
Overall, Model 6 outperforms Model 5 once again, implying that Company X would gain from 
the use of its ledger data as the extension of Rating Alfa scores based on external information.
The whole sample models perform slightly poorer compared to the models using the same 
variables but with the reduced sample. This may be a result from the lack of financial data 
available for some 1600 firms, that is, small firms. In addition to more difficult rating process, 
it might be that smaller firms are less prone to a systematic payment behavior and this is why 
Models 5 and 6 are slightly poorer at classifying these firms as either failed or non-failed. 
Large firms have more established cash in- and outflows and probably more routines in the way 
they pay their bills. Smaller firms may have such cyclical or unstable cash flows that payment 
behavior may vary depending on business cycle.
4.3 Robustness Check – Testing of a More Severe Default
As the main limitation of this study is the unique company-related definition of failure, I expand 
the research by testing ledger variables’ prediction power on a more severe payment default, 
defined by Basel II regulations and widely used by credit agencies and prior literature (see, 
among others, Jappelli & Pagano, 2000; Kocenda & Vojtek, 2009; Minussi, Soopramanien 
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& Worthington, 2007). According to Basel II regulations, default is defined by a delay equal 
or longer than 90 days on any obligation (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). 
In Model 7 the dependent variable ‘DEFAULT’ takes the value of one (1) if at least one bill 
has been paid at least 90 days after the due date during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero (0) 
otherwise. 
If the definition of default according to Basel Committee describes financial distress more 
precisely than Company X’s definition of client profitability measured by payment failure, 
then results shown in Model 7 reinforces that ledger variables accurately predict both financial 
distress and poor paying habits. Ledger variables describing payment history, late8-29 and 
late30+, are significant at the 1% level. Similarly to Models 1-6, firm age is negatively related 
to default likelihood and firm size increases the probability of default, both variables being 
significant at the 1% level. Business relationship’s age with Company X is inversely related 
to the probability of default, although the coefficient loses some of its significance. The results 
confirm the robustness of ledger variables in corporate failure prediction; ledger data are not 
only useful in payment behavior prediction but they can be also used successfully to predict 
actual default.
5 Summary and Conclusion
Prior empirical studies in the credit risk prediction field differ from each other fundamentally 
in terms of failure definitions.32 Definitions of failure have varied from severe consequences 
such as liquidation, bankruptcy and reorganization to inability to pay debts and overdrawn bank 
accounts, followed by even milder versions of failure such as bond defaults and non-payment 
of creditors (see Karels and Prakash, 1987). Officially registered payment defaults have been 
used by Laitinen and Laitinen (2009). According to the writers, 10% of payment defaults in 
Finland are bankruptcies, 2% reorganizations and more than 40% payment private-juridical 
32 See Section 2.2 for further discussion on previous literature on the subject.
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draft protests, rest being value-added tax installments and other defaults officially registered 
by authorities. These, however, only account for registered defaults.  No study so far has used 
a definition of the dependent variable, payment failure, similar to this study; at least three 
payments made at least 30 days after the due date, followed by the client relationship turning 
unprofitable due to collection and monitoring costs linked to systematic late payments. This 
definition allows Company X to separate those clients that are profitable in order to, for example, 
target sales and marketing. It also enables the early recognizing of clients that are more likely to 
end up in a cycle of paying significantly late, much before more severe and significantly more 
costly and resources-wasting consequences such as a bankruptcy trial.
In addition, unlike officially registered payment defaults, client firms’ systematic payment 
delays will probably never be publicized, instead, this information accumulates as companies’ 
internal and private relationship knowledge of their client firms. This study analyzes whether 
companies’ internal and private knowledge could be used to better predict payment failure. 
The results offer a new insight for all companies offering trade credit; ledger transaction 
data are an undervalued source of important information that is extremely helpful in credit 
risk management as it is real-time and available for all existing clients. In fact, as client 
firms’ payment behavior may vary significantly from company to company depending on the 
purchase value and use, internal and private ledger data offer the most accurate and up-to-
date information about a client firm’s impending failure. For example, Company X finds its 
clients to be more punctual in their payments towards the company compared to some other 
companies; Company X’s products are required at the beginning of a construction project 
and thus payment defaults on Company X’s bills would likely end the project completely. 
Consequently, a client firm prefers to delay its payments to “less important” creditors, and 
continue with its project. If this is the case overall, the most important knowledge comes 
indeed from inside the company and its ledger. No external information is able to capture the 
payment behavior of client firms unless payment delays reflect publicly available information 
such as financial statements. It is left for future research to study how well the definition of 
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payment failure used in this paper suits other industries and companies, or whether some 
unique modification is needed to make it more accurate.
Theoretical implications
The purpose of this study was to study the use of corporate ledger information in payment 
behavior prediction and to analyze the possible explanations behind payment failure. Two 
reasons analyzed were: (1) weak financial situation that makes firms unable to pay their bills 
on time due to lack of sufficient cash flow, unprofitability and high leverage, and (2) payment 
pattern that signals for example the misuse of purchase power and thus business relationship in 
order to delay payments for convenience reasons, or treating trade credit as extended credit. 
The results show that weak financials are significantly related to payment failure. The results 
are supported both by financial variables and by Asiakastieto Ltd’s credit rating scores; the 
lower rated, riskier client firms are associated with payment failure more often compared to 
their higher rated peers. The results imply that a weakening financial situation is indeed one 
reason behind poor payment behavior. However, the most dominating factors in payment failure 
prediction seem to be ledger data variables describing payment history. The results clearly 
show that ledger variables are the most accurate and offer the most prediction power in failure 
prediction – the results are moreover supported by the successful use of ledger variables in 
default prediction, also presented in this thesis.
It is likely that for some of the firms, payment habits are motivated by discrete relationship management 
with Company X. This result is supported by the evidence that a more established relationship with 
Company X decreases the likelihood of payment failure. Moreover, Company X has probably 
accumulated superior knowledge of these firms and is able to manage ties with them better. Another 
result supporting the two-fold explanation of poor payment behavior is the effect of size: larger firms 
tend to fail more often. This result could be explained by larger firms’ working capital management, or 
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by the misuse of economies of scale, status and relationship with Company X. The question remains 
whether efficient management is defined by short term maximization of profits and minimization of 
costs, or whether relationship management in fact turns more profitable in the long run.
Managerial implications
The results show that a company benefits most from a model that combines its own ledger 
data to external financial and background information. Asiakastieto Ltd’s current rating scores 
that use external ledger information from other companies are significantly related to payment 
failure, which implies that the sharing of private information might be very useful for companies’ 
credit decision-making not only in the case of new customers but also in modifying the credit 
terms of existing clients. Naturally more research is needed in the areas of using ledger data in 
corporate failure prediction, especially across different industries, and the benefits of sharing 
credit information.
Asiakastieto Ltd and the entire credit rating industry could utilize the results found in this 
study in the development of credit rating services. Jappelli and Pagano (1999) argue that the 
presence of formal information exchanges influences macroeconomic performance. Kallberg 
and Udell (2003) find similar results in their study of information exchanges offered to creditors 
conducting borrower due diligence. The writers suggest that exchange-generated information 
is valuable in measuring borrower quality; it goes beyond publicly available information such 
as financial statements, and it might solve problems arising from credibility problems, data 
coverage problems and data bias problems.
By combining companies’ ledger information to its own information, a credit rating agency could 
offer real-time data on each client’s payment behavior. Consequently, companies could use up-
to-date and possibly customized information as a basis for their credit decisions. Accumulated 
register would be useful especially in industries where companies are not direct competitors 
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of each other but do share the same client base. Naturally a private information exchange pool 
requires a register base large enough to gain from the cumulative effect of sharing clients. 
Kallberg and Udell (2003) study the value of business-to-business voluntary information 
exchange in the US focusing closely on the role and mechanism of the Dun & Bradstreet 
Corporation (D&B), the world’s largest private information exchange. The writers posit that 
credibility is an important issue for an information exchange and that reputation building is 
crucial. Thus, an existing credit rating agency with a steady large company pool could have the 
most potential to start looking at this new approach of credit rating and information sharing.
As noted earlier, clients’ payment behavior is not identical to all companies. On the other 
hand, a company that has a well paying client could yet be warned about the alarming signs of 
the client’s payment difficulties towards a third party – a sign of possible impending failure. 
Accordingly, information sharing could be useful for all the companies sharing their ledger 
information via an intermediary. This kind of a wild future idea could significantly reduce the 
problem of asymmetric information in both intermediaries’ and banks’ credit rating services, 
and facilitate companies’ credit decisions.
Naturally companies have superior information about their own clients over for example 
competitors and rating agencies. However, majority of companies do not have adequate resources 
and knowledge to create their own rating system but it is easier and less costly to use the rating 
services by an external credit agency. The conclusion of this study is that variables computed 
using ledger data can be successfully used to predict future payment behavior, and they offer 
information over and above financial and non-financial background variables. Perhaps it will be 
useful for a credit rating agency to unite real-time ledger data received from a customer company 
to its other external data and hence create unique rating services that are more accurate as they are 
forward-looking, update on a daily basis, and most importantly, the rating services are modified for 
each customer company by using that company’s ledger information and definition of failure. As 
shown in this study, the dependent variable can be chosen according to the needs of each company; 
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the profitability of a client firm–creditor firm relationship differs by industry and product. On the 
other hand, the costs of applying these methods should be measured to ensure that the benefits of 
a more accurate rating compensate the costs of acquiring it.
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Model 1: Logistic regression model based on financial & non-financial variables, reduced sample
The weighted (reduced) sample in the regression consists of Company X’s business-to-business client firms, which have made 
purchases during January 2010 – May 2012 and for which financial statement data is available. The reduced sample consists of some 
5946 failed and 5946 non-failed firms. The independent variables are measured by Asiakastieto Ltd at the end of 2010. Financial 
variables: Current_ratio2010 describes the liquidity of a firm, Equity_ratio2010 describes the relation of equity and total assets, and 
Operating_profit_dummy takes the value of one if a firm has generated negative operating profit, and zero otherwise. Background 
non-financial variables: Industry_risk measures the propensity to default (%) in a firm’s business field, ln(size) and ln(age) are 
the natural logarithm of total assets and firm age in years since registration, respectively. TOL figures describe the higher risk of 
payment failure in following industries compared to other industries; TOL1=manufacturing, TOL2=transportation and storage, 
TOL3=professional, scientific and technical activities, TOL4=administrative and support service activities, TOL5=wholesale 
and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, and TOL6=construction. The dependent variable is measured using 
Company X’s ledger data, and it takes the value of one if a firm has paid at least three of its bills at least 30 days after the due date 
during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero otherwise. All variables and their formulas are presented in Appendix 1. *** And ** And 
* next to the p-values denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel 1: Model summary tests
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
14071.240 0.184 0.245
Panel 2: Parameters of the binary logistic regression model
Variables B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
Current_ratio2010 -0.171 0.016 111.206 1 0.000*** 0.843
Equity_ratio2010 -0.004 0.001 60.063 1 0.000*** 0.996
Industry_risk 0.077 0.008 91.723 1 0.000*** 1.080
ln(size) 0.371 0.012 983.879 1 0.000*** 1.450
ln(age) -0.431 0.029 224.501 1 0.000*** 0.650
Past_default_dummy 0.899 0.156 33.224 1 0.000*** 2.458
Operating_profit_dummy 0.249 0.049 25.590 1 0.000*** 1.283
TOL (others) 449.155 6 0.000***
TOL(1) 0.617 0.087 50.339 1 0.000*** 1.854
TOL(2) 0.674 0.144 21.971 1 0.000*** 1.961
TOL(3) 1.529 0.114 180.775 1 0.000*** 4.614
TOL(4) 1.058 0.116 82.839 1 0.000*** 2.881
TOL(5) 0.745 0.098 58.121 1 0.000*** 2.107
TOL(6) 1.575 0.085 345.827 1 0.000*** 4.830
Constant -5.599 0.207 728.445 1 0.000*** 0.004
Panel 3: Classification accuracy of the modela
Observed Estimation data:
Predicted
Non-failed Failed Correct, %
Non-failed 3992 1954 67.1
Failed 1652 4294 72.2
Overall Percentage 69.7
aThe cut value is 0.500
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Panel 2a: Parameters of the binary logistic regression model
Variables B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
ln(RelationshipAge) -0.328 0.045 52.684 1 0.000*** 0.720
late8-29 13.317 0.348 1468.485 1 0.000*** 607476.608
late30+ 15.287 0.673 516.001 1 0.000*** 4357837.442
ln(size) 0.271 0.012 546.618 1 0.000*** 1.312
ln(age) -0.317 0.035 83.035 1 0.000*** 0.728
Constant -4.029 0.163 613.163 1 0.000*** 0.018
Model 2a: Logistic regression model based on ledger variables, reduced sample
The weighted (reduced) sample in the regression consists of Company X’s business-to-business client firms, which have made 
purchases during January 2010 – May 2012 and for which financial statement data is available. The reduced sample consists of 
some 5946 failed and 5946 non-failed firms. The independent variables describing past payment behavior are measured from 
Company X’s ledger, using transaction data from January 2010 to May 2011. Past payment behavior variables in Model 2a: 
Variable late8-29 measures the natural logarithm of number of bills paid 8-29 days after the due date, divided by natural logarithm 
of total assets in 2010. Variable late30+ measures the natural logarithm of number of bills paid at least 30 days after the due date, 
divided by natural logarithm of total assets in 2010. Past payment behavior variables in Model 2b:Variable RelativeLate measures 
the number of bills paid at least eight days after the due date, divided by the total number of purchases made by the same firm. 
Variable RelativeLate30+ measures the number of bills paid at least 30 days after the due date, divided by the total number of 
bills paid at least eight days after the due date by the same firm. In addition, ln(RelationshipAge) is the natural logarithm of the 
client relationship age in years. The dependent variable is measured using Company X’s ledger data, and it takes the value of one 
if a firm has paid at least three of its bills at least 30 days after the due date during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero otherwise. All 
variables and their formulas are presented in Appendix 1. *** And ** And * next to the p-values denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel 1a: Model summary tests
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R-Square
10827.934 0.378 0.505
Panel 3a: Classification accuracy of the modela
Observed Estimation data:
Predicted
Non-failed Failed Correct, %
Non-failed 4963 980 83.5
Failed 1486 4459 75.0
Overall Percentage 79.3
aThe cut value is 0.500
Model 2b: Logistic regression model based on ledger variables, reduced sample
Panel 1b: Model summary tests
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
13862.880 0.198 0.264
Panel 2b: Parameters of the binary logistic regression model
Variables B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
ln(RelationshipAge) 0.061 0.041 2.201 1 0.138 1.063
RelativeLate 2.584 0.085 917.879 1 0.000*** 13.250
RelativeLate30+ 1.789 0.092 378.583 1 0.000*** 5.983
ln(size) 0.264 0.011 628.119 1 0.000*** 1.302
ln(age) -0.442 0.031 208.169 1 0.000*** 0.643
Constant -3.460 0.151 526.422 1 0.000*** 0.031
Panel 3b: Classification accuracy of the modela
Observed Estimation data:
Predicted
Non-failed Failed Correct, %
Non-failed 4434 1512 74.6
Failed 2015 3931 66.1
Overall Percentage 70.3
aThe cut value is 0.500
74Appendix 2
Panel 2: Parameters of the binary logistic regression model
Variables B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
ln(RelationshipAge) -0.511 0.048 111.194 1 0.000*** 0.600
late8-29 12.168 0.373 1064.498 1 0.000*** 192600.209
late30+ 16.651 0.711 547.734 1 0.000*** 17039737.308
ln(size) 0.399 0.014 812.438 1 0.000*** 1.490
ln(age) -0.227 0.037 37.872 1 0.000*** 0.797
Industry_risk 0.079 0.010 67.350 1 0.000*** 1.082
Current_ratio2010 -0.063 0.013 22.103 1 0.000*** 0.939
Equity_ratio2010 0.001 0.001 3.517 1 0.061* 1.001
Past_default_dummy 0.412 0.227 3.286 1 0.070* 1.510
Operating_profit_dummy 0.324 0.060 29.698 1 0.000*** 1.383
TOL2 (others) 222.131 6 0.000***
TOL2(1) 0.339 0.104 10.549 1 0.001*** 1.404
TOL2(2) 0.290 0.165 3.090 1 0.079* 1.336
TOL2(3) 1.302 0.131 98.724 1 0.000*** 3.677
TOL2(4) 1.170 0.135 75.486 1 0.000*** 3.222
TOL2(5) 0.800 0.109 53.745 1 0.000*** 2.225
TOL2(6) 1.182 0.100 140.884 1 0.000*** 3.261
Constant -7.251 0.250 842.125 1 0.000*** 0.001
Model 3: Logistic regression model based on ledger information and financial & non-financial variables, reduced sample
The weighted (reduced) sample in the regression consists of Company X’s business-to-business client firms, which have made 
purchases during January 2010 – May 2012 and for which financial statement data is available. The reduced sample consists of 
some 5946 failed and 5946 non-failed firms. The independent variables are measured partly by Asiakastieto Ltd at the end of 
2010, and partly constructed using Company X’s ledger transaction data from January 2010 to May 2011. Financial variables: 
Current_ratio2010 describes the liquidity of a firm, Equity_ratio2010 describes the relation of equity and total assets, and 
Operating_profit_dummy takes the value of one if a firm has generated negative operating profit, and zero otherwise. Background 
non-financial variables: Industry_risk measures the propensity to default (%) in a firm’s business field, ln(size) and ln(age) are 
the natural logarithm of total assets and firm age in years since registration, respectively. TOL figures describe the higher risk of 
payment failure in following industries compared to other industries; TOL1=manufacturing, TOL2=transportation and storage, 
TOL3=professional, scientific and technical activities, TOL4=administrative and support service activities, TOL5=wholesale and 
retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, and TOL6=construction. Past payment behavior variables: Variable late8-29 
measures the natural logarithm of number of bills paid 8-29 days after the due date, divided by natural logarithm of total assets in 
2010. Variable late30+ measures the natural logarithm of number of bills paid at least 30 days after the due date, divided by natural 
logarithm of total assets in 2010. In addition, ln(RelationshipAge) is the natural logarithm of the client relationship age in years. 
The dependent variable is measured using Company X’s ledger data, and it takes the value of one if a firm has paid at least three of 
its bills at least 30 days after the due date during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero otherwise. All variables and their formulas are 
presented in Appendix 1. *** And ** And * next to the p-values denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel 1: Model summary tests
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
10248.797 0.408 0.544
Panel 3: Classification accuracy of the modela
Observed Estimation data:
Predicted
Non-failed Failed Correct, %
Non-failed 4969 974 83.6
Failed 1321 4625 77.8
Overall Percentage 80.7
aThe cut value is 0.500
75 Appendix 2
Panel 3: Classification accuracy of the modela
Observed Estimation data:
Predicted
Non-failed Failed Correct, %
Non-failed 4942 1001 83.2
Failed 1387 4559 76.7
Overall Percentage 79.9
aThe cut value is 0.500
Panel 2: Parameters of the binary logistic regression model
Variables B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
ln(RelationshipAge) -0.288 0.046 39.244 1 0.000*** 0.750
late8-29 12.733 0.356 1276.289 1 0.000*** 338643.472
late30+ 15.356 0.695 488.601 1 0.000*** 4669163.883
ln(size) 0.313 0.013 582.644 1 0.000*** 1.367
ln(age) -0.242 0.037 43.452 1 0.000*** 0.785
Rating score (C) 98.344 6 0.000***
AAA -1.026 0.149 47.381 1 0.000*** 0.359
AA+ -1.088 0.138 62.301 1 0.000*** 0.337
AA -0.589 0.142 17.192 1 0.000*** 0.555
A+ -0.601 0.133 20.483 1 0.000*** 0.548
A -0.502 0.135 13.822 1 0.000*** 0.605
B -0.545 0.166 10.764 1 0.001*** 0.580
Constant -4.107 0.216 362.553 1 0.000*** 0.016
Model 4: Logistic regression model based on ledger variables and Rating Alfa, reduced sample
The weighted (reduced) sample in the regression consists of Company X’s business-to-business client firms, which have made 
purchases during January 2010 – May 2012 and for which financial statement data is available. The reduced sample consists of 
some 5946 failed and 5946 non-failed firms. The independent variables describing past payment behavior are measured from 
Company X’s ledger, using transaction data from January 2010 to May 2011. Past payment behavior variables: Variable late8-29 
measures the natural logarithm of number of bills paid 8-29 days after the due date, divided by natural logarithm of total assets in 
2010. Variable late30+ measures the natural logarithm of number of bills paid at least 30 days after the due date, divided by natural 
logarithm of total assets in 2010. In addition, ln(RelationshipAge) is the natural logarithm of the client relationship age in years. 
Letter rating variables refer to rating scores Asiakastieto Ltd’s has assigned to each firm in the sample at the end of 2010, and they 
measure each letter rating’s association to payment failure, compared to lowest rating ‘C’. The dependent variable is measured 
using Company X’s ledger data, and it takes the value of one if a firm has paid at least three of its bills at least 30 days after the due 
date during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero otherwise. All variables and their formulas are presented in Appendix 1. *** And ** 
And * next to the p-values denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel 1: Model summary tests
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
10727.298 0.384 0.512
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Panel 2: Parameters of the binary logistic regression model
Variables B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
ln(RelationshipAge) -0.288 0.035 66.386 1 0.000*** 0.750
late8-29 10.359 0.303 1170.939 1 0.000*** 31524.496
late30+ 13.498 0.634 453.405 1 0.000*** 728130.641
ln(size) 0.292 0.011 717.889 1 0.000*** 1.339
ln(age) -0.385 0.027 202.447 1 0.000*** 0.680
Constant -3.700 0.155 572.971 1 0.000*** 0.025
Model 5: Logistic regression model based on ledger variables, whole sample
The weighted (whole) sample in the regression consists of Company X’s business-to-business client firms, which have made 
purchases during January 2010 – May 2012. The whole sample consists of some 7741 failed and 7741 non-failed firms. The 
independent variables describing past payment behavior are measured from Company X’s ledger, using transaction data from 
January 2010 to May 2011. Past payment behavior variables: Variable late8-29 measures the natural logarithm of number of 
bills paid 8-29 days after the due date, divided by natural logarithm of total assets in 2010. Variable late30+ measures the natural 
logarithm of number of bills paid at least 30 days after the due date, divided by natural logarithm of total assets in 2010. In addition, 
ln(RelationshipAge) is the natural logarithm of the client relationship age in years. The dependent variable is measured using 
Company X’s ledger data, and it takes the value of one if a firm has paid at least three of its bills at least 30 days after the due date 
during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero otherwise. All variables and their formulas are presented in Appendix 1. *** And ** And 
* next to the p-values denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel 1: Model summary tests
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
16233.074 0.287 0.382
Panel 3: Classification accuracy of the modela
Observed Estimation data:
Predicted
Non-failed Failed Correct, %
Non-failed 6295 1446 81.3
Failed 2637 5104 65.9
Overall Percentage 73.6
aThe cut value is 0.500
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Panel 2: Parameters of the binary logistic regression model
Variables B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
ln(RelationshipAge) -0.262 0.037 51.051 1 0.000*** 0.770
late8-29 10.376 0.310 1118.483 1 0.000*** 32065.614
late30+ 14.199 0.670 448.861 1 0.000*** 1467348.232
ln(size) 0.359 0.012 890.046 1 0.000*** 1.432
ln(age) -0.145 0.030 23.213 1 0.000*** 0.865
Rating score (C) 637.305 6 0.000***
AAA -2.271 0.114 398.786 1 0.000*** 0.103
AA+ -2.249 0.101 497.758 1 0.000*** 0.106
AA -1.790 0.100 319.168 1 0.000*** 0.167
A+ -1.672 0.095 308.472 1 0.000*** 0.188
A -1.159 0.095 148.476 1 0.000*** 0.314
B -1.034 0.124 69.715 1 0.000*** 0.356
Constant -3.701 0.196 357.531 1 0.000*** 0.025
Model 6: Logistic regression model based on ledger variables and Rating Alfa, whole sample
The weighted (whole) sample in the regression consists of Company X’s business-to-business client firms, which have made 
purchases during January 2010 – May 2012 and for which financial statement data is available. The whole sample consists of 
some 7741 failed and 7741 non-failed firms. The independent variables describing past payment behavior are measured from 
Company X’s ledger, using transaction data from January 2010 to May 2011. Past payment behavior variables: Variable late8-29 
measures the natural logarithm of number of bills paid 8-29 days after the due date, divided by natural logarithm of total assets in 
2010. Variable late30+ measures the natural logarithm of number of bills paid at least 30 days after the due date, divided by natural 
logarithm of total assets in 2010. In addition, ln(RelationshipAge) is the natural logarithm of the client relationship age in years. 
Letter rating variables refer to rating scores Asiakastieto Ltd’s has assigned to each firm in the sample at the end of 2010, and they 
measure each letter rating’s association to payment failure, compared to lowest rating ‘C’. The dependent variable is measured 
using Company X’s ledger data, and it takes the value of one if a firm has paid at least three of its bills at least 30 days after the due 
date during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero otherwise. All variables and their formulas are presented in Appendix 1. *** And ** 
And * next to the p-values denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel 1: Model summary tests
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
15527.607 0.318 0.425
Panel 3: Classification accuracy of the modela
Observed Estimation data:
Predicted
Non-failed Failed Correct, %
Non-failed 6275 1466 81.1
Failed 2265 5476 70.7
Overall Percentage 75.9
aThe cut value is 0.500
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Panel 2: Parameters of the binary logistic regression model
Variables B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
ln(RelationshipAge) -0.071 0.037 3.688 1 0.055* 0.931
late8-29 4.055 0.315 165.491 1 0.000*** 57.713
late30+ 10.439 0.648 259.310 1 0.000*** 34167.688
ln(size) 0.134 0.010 187.031 1 0.000*** 1.143
ln(age) -0.121 0.029 17.607 1 0.000*** 0.886
Constant -1.852 0.136 186.431 1 0.000*** 0.157
Model 7: Logistic regression model based on ledger variables, testing default defined by Basel II, whole sample
The weighted (whole) sample in the regression consists of Company X’s business-to-business client firms, which have made 
purchases during January 2010 – May 2012. The whole sample consists of some 7741 failed and 7741 non-failed firms. The 
independent variables describing past payment behavior are measured from Company X’s ledger, using transaction data from 
January 2010 to May 2011. Past payment behavior variables: Variable late8-29 measures the natural logarithm of number of 
bills paid 8-29 days after the due date, divided by natural logarithm of total assets in 2010. Variable late30+ measures the natural 
logarithm of number of bills paid at least 30 days after the due date, divided by natural logarithm of total assets in 2010. In addition, 
ln(RelationshipAge) is the natural logarithm of the client relationship age in years. The dependent variable is measured using 
Company X’s ledger data, and it takes the value of one if a firm has paid at least one of its bills at least 90 days after the due date 
during June 2011 – May 2012, and zero otherwise. All variables and their formulas are presented in Appendix 1. *** And ** And 
* next to the p-values denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel 1: Model summary tests
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
14892.357 0.094 0.125
Panel 3: Classification accuracy of the modela
Observed Estimation data:
Predicted
Non-default Default Correct, %
Non-default 4245 1536 73.4
Default 2740 3044 52.6
Overall Percentage 63.0
aThe cut value is 0.500
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